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What is it about our po litica l process that enables legislatures and  
governments to ignore the m ost fundam ental interests o f  significant 
segm ents o f  society with impunity ? l
I. Introductio n
There are some 3,000-4,000 hereditary diseases related to errors in our genetic code 
including cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, diabetes and various forms of cancer 
(breast, stomach, colorectal etc).2 The Canadian Breast Cancer Foundation estimates 
that 22,200 women will have been diagnosed with breast cancer in 2006 and 5,300 
will die; of the 160 estimated new cases of breast cancer in men, 45 are expected to 
die. Breast Cancer is a disease that disproportionately affects women, 
predominately those between the ages of 50-69.4 Although breast cancer is the most 
frequently diagnosed cancer among Canadian women, it is also one of the most
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4 Over 50% of diagnoised breast cancer is in women between 50 - 69. Canadian Cancer Society “Media 
Backgrounder: Canadian Cancer Statistics 2006 - Screening: Breast, colorectal, and cervical” (11 April
2006), online: <http://www.cancer.ca>. Nevertheless, a gendered analysis of the issues and any 
potential equality-based constitutional claim under s. 15 of the Charter will not be pursued in this paper.
treatable; deaths could be reduced by one quarter if 70% of women in this age group 
receive routine clinical breast exams and biannual screening.5
Predictive genetic screening for cancer related genes is an effective and integral 
part of using new technology to battle cancer. Both the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
have been linked with the propensity to develop breast and ovarian cancer while 
HMPPC has been associated with colorectal cancer. The American firm of Myriad 
Genetic Laboratories Inc. (Myriad), which holds the patents over both the above 
genes and their diagnostic testing, sought to enforce their exclusive rights in Canada 
by threatening litigation with cease and desist letters sent to the governments of 
British Columbia and Ontario in 2001.
For cancer patients and their political supporters, the exclusive right to control 
access and set the price for something which already exists as a product of nature 
makes gene patenting reprehensible and simply wrong. Ontario’s then Premier, 
Mike Harris, refused to back down in response to Myriad’s legal threats, saying in a 
speech to the Ontario Advisory Committee on Predictive Genetic Technology6 that 
Canada needs to amend its laws to prevent privatization of human genes and that 
“[u]like new drugs, genes aren’t invented -  they are discovered. They have always 
existed.” Additionally, Mike Harris urged that:
[t]he benefits of a world-wide effort such as the human genome project 
should not be the property of a handful of people or of companies. Our 
genetic heritage belongs to everyone. We must share its benefits fairly.
We must do what we can to make genetic tests and therapies affordable 
and accessible... [i]f we have the ability to save a life, we have a 
responsibility to do so.7
Tony Clement, Provincial Minister of Health at the time, consistently defended 
the position of the Ontario government for its continued diagnostic screening of 
BRCA1 and 2 despite criticism by industry that this constituted an uncompensated
5 Genevieve Beauchemin, “More screening could cut cancer deaths: report” CTV News (11 April 2006), 
online: <http://sympaticomsn.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060411/cancer_screening
060411>. See also Canadian Breast Cancer Foundation, online: <http://www.cbcf.org 
/news/events.html#erin>.
6 This Committee undertook broad consultation and a review of the legal issues surrounding gene 
patenting. See generally, See Lisa Austin & Bita Amani, “Patents on Genes: Identifying Issues and 
Responses” (Discussion Paper prepared for and internally distributed to the Ontario Provincial 
Advisory Committee on New Genetic Technologies, Toronto, Ontario, October 2001) [unpublished, 
on file with the authors] also included as an annex to “Legal and Ethical Challenges of New Predictive 
Genetic Testing”, Report of the Legal and Ethical Subcommittee of the Provincial Advisory 
Committee on New Predictive Genetic Technologies (2003) (Co-Chairs of the Committee: T. 
Lemmens & R. Mykitiuk and authors/contributors: Mireille Lacroix, Lisa Austin, Bita Amani).
7 Robert Benzie, “Ontario to defy U.S. patents on cancer genes: Province will pay for $800 test, not 
$3,850 version by Myriad Genetic Laboratories Inc.: ‘Share the Benefits’” National Post (20 
September 2001) A15.
public taking.8 Clement remained ever mindful of the limited resources and duty of 
his government to respond to the health needs of its constituents. Ontario continued 
its testing of Canadian patients in the public health system at approximately one-fifth 
of the cost without licence. 9 Since then, the Canadian Cancer Society (CCS) has 
taken the position that it opposes the exclusive rights of gene patent holders if they 
are used to interfere with an individual’s health, impede the development of new 
knowledge, or restrict Canadian women’s access to cancer-related genomic testing.10
While the governments in this case displayed an atypical preference for 
individual health rights by prioritizing the delivery of public health over private 
proprietary claims in the field of cancer genomics, nothing today bars the issuing of 
new gene patents nor is there any comprehensive policy for their regulation.11 In 
fact, the Canadian Patent Office (CPO)12 has long been granting patents on genes 
from a variety of species, proteins, and micro-organisms without public scrutiny, 
participatory debate, or attention to the need for cross-policy co-ordination. As the 
ensuing discussion will show, the validity of gene patents is increasingly at issue 
within patent law for failure to meet established legislative and doctrinal 
requirements. As DNA provides genetic information, it has been argued that 
granting patents for the discovery of genes based on their isolation or purification is 
actually an inappropriate private taking from the information commons.13 The 
Commissioner of Patents nevertheless continues to grant these patents pursuant to his 
authority under the Canadian Patent Act (CPA).14 This article addresses potential 
public authority liability for the granting of gene patents.
The BRCA1/2 controversy raises important considerations of distributive 
justice, legal ethics, economics, human rights, social costs related to the patenting of 
genes, the unintended consequences of legislative inertia, and the need for 
governmental accountability. Literature dealing with patents and human rights tends 
to reflect the hegemony of trade and proprietary values by disproportionately
See e.g. Tony Clement, Minister of Health and Long Term Care, “The Myriad Gene Patent Issue” 
(Speech delivered, 19 September 2001).
9 See e.g. Bita Amani, “Patents and Public Health: International Trade Obligations and Domestic Policy 
Development” (2002) 22 Health L. Can. 76.
10 Canadian Cancer Society, “The patenting of BRCA1 and 2 genes” (16 January 2006), online: 
<http://www.cancer.ca/ccs/intemet/standard/0,3182,3172 31282995__langld-en,00.html>.
11 See Austin & Amani, “Patents on Genes” supra note 6. See also Ontario, Provincial Advisory 
Committee on New Predictive Genetic Technologies, Genetic Services in Ontario: Mapping the 
Future (Ontario: Provincial Advisory Committee on New Predictive Genetic Technologies, 2001), 
online: <http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/geneticsrep01/genetic _report.pdf>.
12 For the Canadian Patent Database, see Canadian Intellectual Property Office, online: 
<http://patents 1 .ic.gc.ca/intro-e.html>.
13 See Bita Amani, “What’s Not Right About Intellectual Property? The Public Interest in Private Rights 
and the Human Right to Participate in Knowledge Production” [unpublished, on file with author],
14 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 [Patent Act].
focusing on the economic costs of infringement under domestic patent laws and the 
larger cost of state non-compliance with trade-related patent rights under the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Agreement (TRIPS).15
Neither property nor health rights are expressly protected under the Canadian 
Constitution. Proposed public liability for the breach of an individual’s right to 
health under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms16 is, however, a much 
needed countervailing consideration against the threat of trade sanctions and would 
help ensure greater domestic accountability over the grant of gene patents which are 
presumptively valid17 state granted monopolies that confer enforceable “exclusive” 
rights for the patent holder (patentee) for twenty years. Constitutional 
accountability, which has the potential to achieve positive health outcomes, should 
not be ignored.
This article fills the scholarly aperture by canvassing the other costs for non- 
compliance associated with the international human right obligation of health where 
gene patents are concerned. It does so by engaging in a Charter analysis informed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision in Jacques Chaoulli and George 
Zeliotis v. Quebec (Attorney General).18 Doctor Jacques Chaoulli and Mr. George 
Zeliotis challenged Québec’s legislation restricting the ability of Quebeckers to 
purchase private health care, in order to avoid the long waiting lists in the public 
system, Zeliotis had suffered a number of health problems which were exacerbated 
by delays in the public health care system. It has been reported that the waiting list 
for hip replacement surgery is two years and for radiation therapy after breast- 
conserving surgery, sixteen weeks.19 Dr. Chaoulli was a practicing physician whose 
efforts to get a licence for private operations had met with consistent opposition. The 
Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge’s finding championed, for the
15 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Elsewhere I have argued that 
TRIPS impact on domestic policy choices may be mediated through a prescribed bifurcated approach 
for defending regulatory diversity to allow the trumping of human rights over industrial policy in order 
to avoid trade sanctions resulting from a successful WTO complaint. See Bita Amani, Merchants and 
Missionaries: Patenting Life, Competing International Obligations and the Proselytization of a 
Realistic Utopia (SJD Dissertation, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 2007) [unpublished, on file 
with author] [Amani, Merchants and Missionaries] wherein I dispel the mythology around the claim 
that international trade law mandates governments to give patent policy priority over health and human 
rights where biopatenting is concerned.
16 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
17 S. 43(2) of the Patent Act provides the presumption of validity: “After a patent is issued, it shall, in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, be valid and avail the patentee and the legal representatives of 
the patentee for the term mentioned..
18 Jacques Chaoulli and George Zeliotis v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [Chaoulli].
19 Colleen Flood & Terrence Sullivan, “Supreme disagreement: The highest court affirms an empty 
right” (2005) 173:2 CMAJ 142.
most part, by government experts touting the propriety of Canadian wait times and 
the efficacy of the Canadian public health system. They concluded that the contested 
legislation did not violate either the Federal or Quebec Charters. The Supreme Court 
of Canada had a different perspective on the matter.
Only seven of nine members of the SCC sat for the appeal and, in a 4:3 split, 
the majority held that the contested legislation was impermissibly offensive to the 
individual rights and freedoms of Quebeckers and reversed the finding of the lower 
courts. Three of the majority justices, McLachlin C.J.C., and Major and Bastarache 
JJ., found that the prohibition violated s. 7 of the Charter and could not be justified 
as a reasonable limit under s. 1. The fourth justice, Deschamps J., found that as the 
prohibition violated the broader language of the Quebec Charter it did not require 
further consideration under the narrower provision of rights in the Canadian 
Charter. 20 The three judges forming the dissent, Binnie, LeBel, and Fish JJ., found 
that s. 7 was not violated and that the case pertained to the allocation of resources 
which is a policy issue more appropriately dealt with by the capable hands of 
democratically elected representatives than by judges.21
I argue that the recent judgment in Chaoulli can be analyzed broadly as the start 
of a constitutionalized right to health within an emerging public law action for 
regulatory negligence. Interpreted against a backdrop of “constitutional tort” 
jurisprudence, public sector liability may now be expanded to account for failure to 
protect individual health from unjustified state intrusion, whether that intrusion is 
from a faulty “operational” measure in applying the statutory standards for 
patentability set out in the CPA or a faulty “policy” decision by CPO in treating 
genetic sequences to be patentable subject matter a priori. Constitutional remedies 
could include a declaration (including invalidation of gene patents and a call for a 
moratorium), monetary damages, injunctive relief and other possibilities available 
under the Charter for failure to regulate public health in a manner consistent with 
Canada’s obligations under international human rights instruments and now 
consitutionalized by Chaoulli.
20 This is because the language of the Quebec Charter includes the word personal “inviolability” as 
compared to the Charter’s narrower “security of the person”. See Chaoulli, supra note 18, paras. 26- 
33.
21 “We are unable to agree with our four colleagues who would allow the appeal that such a debate 
should be resolved as a matter of law by judges. We find that, on the legal issues raised, the appeal 
should be dismissed.” Ibid. at para. 161. Binnie and LeBel JJ., writing for the dissent, state in the same 
paragraph:
The question in this appeal is whether the province of Quebec not only has the 
constitutional authority to establish a comprehensive single-tier health plan, but to 
discourage a second (private tier) health sector by prohibiting the purchase and sale 
of private health insurance. The appellants argue that timely access to needed 
medical service is not being provided in the publicly funded system and that the 
province cannot therefore deny those Quebeckers (who can qualify) the right to 
purchase private insurance to pay for medical services whenever and wherever such 
services can be obtained for a fee... This issue has been the subject of protracted 
debate across Canada through several provincial and federal elections.
II. O verview
The remainder of this article is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides a basic 
primer on patent law and considers traditional private law remedies for public sector 
liability in order to determine whether a private action in tort could be made against 
the government for the issue of gene patents. After identifying the limitations of a 
private law approach, Part 1 also considers the possibility of public law proceedings 
for regulatory negligence under the Charter and compares this with pursuing 
invalidity under patent law. Finally, Part 1 will also establish that the Charter 
applies to the impugned state action.
Having established that the Charter does apply to the grant of gene patents, Part
2 considers the second legal element for a successful constitutional challenge: Has 
there has been a violation of a Charter right? Canada’s international human rights 
obligations clearly commit our government to protecting the individual right to 
health. Existing domestic implementation of these obligations are reviewed before 
considering ChaoullVs impact. The Chaoulli decision has been widely criticized as 
‘poisoning’ Canada’s public health care program by effectively sanctioning a two- 
tier system for health delivery that allows private insured services not offered in the 
public system. Its critics gripe that it has paved the way for an impoverished 
realization of the right to health22 and definitively betrays the fantastical ‘dream’ of 
social justice that the Charter was to stand for.23 However, it will be argued that 
perhaps the focus on how the Chaoulli decision constrains a positive right to health 
in the future is too narrow. A progressive defence of Chaoulli is offered, in the 
alternative, to unveil its potential for creating public authority accountability for the 
grant of gene patents by recognizing a nascent negative right to health. This 
recognition is necessary to ground a public law remedy given that, at present, neither 
tort nor patent law provide effective means to address the health-related harms 
arising from the CPO’s actions.
Having established that the Charter applies and that s. 7 rights, as understood in 
Chaoulli, have been violated, Part 3 analyzes whether the resulting restriction of the 
right to health subsumed within the s. 7 rights to life and to security of the person is a 
reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter. Finally, a constitutional challenge of 
the CPO’s grant of gene patents, informed by our new understanding of Chaoulli’s 
potential, is presented.
22 See Martha Jackman, “The Last Line of Defence for [Which?] Citizens”: Accountability, Equality and 
the Right to Health in Chaoulir (2006) 44:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 349, online: 
<www.healthcoalition.ca/Jackman-CHC.pdf > [Jackman, “Last Line of Defence”].
23 Allan C. Hutchinson, “‘Condition Critical’: The Constitution and Health Care” in Colleen M. Flood, 
Lome Sossin & Kent Roach, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private 
Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 101 at 103-05.
It is hoped that by working through a Charter challenge regarding cancer 
genomics, public law will be considered as an additional means for stymieing the 
proliferation of biopatents that fail to meet the requirements of “inventiveness” or 
otherwise extend to non-patentable subject-matter; and for achieving social justice 
by holding governments accountable for their failure to regulate with care where that 
failure impacts a Charter right. Addressing the constitutionality of gene patents has 
important applications in the field of predictive genomic screening, gene therapy, 
and cancer prevention; this issue must therefore be part of any intervention plan to 
improve health and cancer service access because access “is not just definitive final 
treatment, but begins with prevention and screening.”24
Pa r t  1 - Public  Secto r  L iability  fo r  “W ro ngs”
Patent policy in Canada is incoherent and generally lacking in public consultation 
and democratic debate. A patent must be applied for at the CPO and is granted by a 
patent examiner on behalf of the Commissioner25 for a period of twenty years if it 
meets the statutory requirements for “invention” defined as any “art, process, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter” or a new and useful improvement to 
any of these.26 An examiner may reject an application with reasons if positively 
unsatisfied that the statutory requirements have been met. Such a decision could 
then be appealed to the Patent Appeal Board comprised of senior examiners who 
make further recommendations to the Commissioner.27 There is no discretion, 
however, in granting the patent if the CPO is otherwise satisfied that the statutory 
requirements have been met.28 So long as the invention, which could cover product 
and process claims meets the statutory definition; falls into the scope of patentable 
subject matter i.e. is not expressly excluded by statute; and is new, useful,30 non-
24 T. Sullivan et al. “A Just Measure of Patience: Managing access to cancer services after Chaoulir in 
Flood, Sossin & Roach, ibid. 454 at 457.
25 Patent Act, supra note 14, s. 4, establishes the duties of the Commissioner and allows for the 
delegation of these duties pursuant to the legislation.
26 Ibid. s. 2.
27 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-Marks (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law,
1997) at 117 [Vaver, Intellectual Property Law].
28 Patent Act, supra note 14, s. 40.
29 Ibid. s. 28.2(1). Novelty refers to the fact that the invention has not yet been disclosed in public. 
Before a patent is granted there is a search of the prior art (that is any material already in the public 
domain) to ensure that the application is in fact a new invention and that as far as is known in good 
faith, it does not infringe any other patented inventions in that jurisdiction.
30 Utility, in relation to inventions “means industrial value”, sometimes it may mean industrial 
application and “must be apparent from the description to one of skill in the art.” See Industry Canada, 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice (March 1998), s. 16.02.01, 
online: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/mopop_dnld-e.html>. The invention 
must have utility but our laws do not generally require a model prototype to be made or that its utility be shown.
obvious31 and fully disclosed, then it is to be patented.32 Where the patent 
examiners, the Patent Board and the Patent Commissioner do have discretion is in 
how strictly the patentability criteria are applied. This discretion makes these 
decisions “operational” and thereby subject to a negligence standard. The decisions 
of the CPO, Commissioner, examiners, or any other delegates, are made pursuant to 
statute and are therefore actions to which the Charter applies.33 If, as in the field of 
biopatenting, judicial developments support patentability as likely, “the [C]PO may 
grant the application, leaving the courts to decide validity in contested litigation.”
A patentee may appeal an adverse decision of the CPO directly to the Federal Court 
of Appeal and ultimately to the SCC. The Charter, of course, also applies to 
common law rules.35
1. Comparing Public Sector Liability in Private and Public Law
In this section I will compare and contrast the potential for public authority liability 
in tort and under the Charter for the issue of gene patents. Imagine I am a 
complainant who wants to challenge the issue of gene patents and is interested in 
pursuing the state for monetary damages. What are my avenues for redress? 
Tortious liability of the state has long raised complicated issues of immunity, justice, 
loss allocation, and limitations (including limitation periods) stemming from the 
various legislation regulating public sector liability. S. 5 of the Proceedings Against 
the Crown Act {PACA) allows for liability in tort against the Crown.36 The PAC A 
answers the procedural question of whether the Crown can be sued in tort but does 
not provide when the Crown owes a duty of care or how that duty may arise. 
Similarly, the Public Authorities Protection Act (PAPA)37 establishes the requisite 
notice period and other formalities such as a six month limitation period which was 
substantially shorter than the six years applicable to other tortfeasors, both are now
31 S. 28.3 of the Patent Act was added in 1993 as a codification of this common law requirement of 
inventiveness. S. 28.3 of the Patent Act requires that the invention not be obvious and that it not be 
information publicly available “in Canada or elsewhere”.
32 Patent Act, supra note 14, s. 27.
33 See Charter, supra note 16, s. 32; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of 
Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 applying the Charter to the confiscation of “obscene” material by 
Customs inspectors pursuant to authority granted by legislation [Little Sisters]', See generally, Peter 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf, vol. 2, at p. 34-11 [Hogg, Constitutional Law of 
Canada, looseleaf].
34 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 27 at 117.
35 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., (Canada: Carswell, 1992) at 888 [Hogg, 
Consitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed.].
36 R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5: “...the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person 
of full age and capacity, it would be subject, (1) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or 
agents...”
37 R .S .0 .1990, c. P.38.
replaced by a universal two year period without Crown favour.38 The Crown may 
therefore enjoy immunity in tort either under statute or because of a lapsed limitation 
period. However the Crown can still be found liable under s. 24 of the Charter.39 
One of the benefits of actions under the Charter is that limitations arguably should 
not apply; the supremacy of the Charter would be undermined if Parliament could 
legislate out of its constitutional obligations. Also, since different provinces provide 
for different limitation periods, Charter rights would be incoherently variable.40
The Crown was historically immune from liability on the premise that “the king 
can do no wrong.” Because there was no duty on the Crown at common law, these 
statutes were seen as generous in granting plaintiffs the right to sue and were initially 
narrowly interpreted. However, once it became established that the Crown could be 
sued, the statutes appeared to restrict individual rights by establishing formal and 
technical parameters for actions against the Crown and thus were often liberally 
interpretted.41
38 Limitations Act, 202, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, s. 4 establishes the basic limitation period of 2 years 
while s. 3 binds the Crown to that period.
39 See e.g. Hawley v. Bapoo, 76 O.R. (3d) 649 (Ont. S.CJ.) wherein it was found that two Crown 
Attorneys, although subject to suits for malicious prosecution, were immune from suits for negligence 
because of s. 5(6) of the PACA; other claims made were for abuse of public office, breach of a 
statutory duty and infringement of the plaintiffs ss. 7 and 11(b) Charter rights and vicarious liability 
of the Crown for its agents. Because the then 6 month limitation period had lapsed, all actions were 
dismissed by the Superior Court except for allegations claiming relief under s. 24 of the Charter.
40 For a judicial precedent by the Ontario Court of Appeal that limitation periods do not apply to Charter 
violations and relief claimed under s. 24(2), see Prete v. Ontario (1993), 16. O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) at 
68, Carthy J. writing for the Court, expounds:
Put in this Charter context, I see no valid comparison between procedural rules of 
court and statutory limitation periods. I do see identity between statutes granting 
immunity and those imposing limitation periods after the time when the limitation 
arises. Having found that immunity is not available under the Proceedings Against 
the Crown Act from a claim for Charter remedy, it therefore follows that in my 
opinion s. 11 of the Public Authorities Protection Act should be read as not 
applying to relief claimed under s. 24(1) of the Charter.
But see the conflicting view in St. Onge v. Canada, [2001] F.CJ. No. 1569, affd  [2001] F.C.J. No. 
1523 (C.A.) (QL), at para. 2:
[S]ection 45(l)(g) of the Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 15 is an enactment of general 
application that applies to any civil liability action, irrespective of whether it is based on a 
violation of Charter rights. The six-year limitation period in the Act is immune to the 
controversy surrounding the constitutional validity of short limitation periods when they 
preclude the exercise of a Charter right.
41 See e.g. McNabb v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 402 (Ont. S.C.J.). See also Latta 
v. Ontario (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 157, where the plaintiff sued the Crown for serious injuries 
sustained during incarceration in a correctional facility when he tripped over a sand-filled pail that was 
being used as a door stopper. He notified the guards immediately, filled out an accident report but did 
not serve a notice of a claim for negligence on the Crown until after the 10 day limitation period 
required by statute under s. 5(l)(c) of the PACA. The Court of Appeal for Ontario generously found 
that the reporting of the accident was sufficient to satisfy “notice” within the 10 day limitation period.
Before liability may be found, a duty of care is needed and may arise under 
statute or common law. The CPA does not articulate any duty of care owed to the 
public generally or to individuals of the public privately by the Commissioner in 
granting or denying a patent application although the Act does provide the 
Commissioner and other Crown agents (such as examiners and the Board) immunity 
from personal liability. The SCC was instructive on public sector liability in Cooper 
v. Hobart;42 a case about the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers, a statutory regulator, 
who suspended a registered mortgage broker’s licence but was being sued in 
negligence for failing to act more promptly to avoid or dimmish the losses suffered 
by investors who continued to advance money to the broker in the interim.43 The 
Court found that if there is a duty of care to the public then a private duty of care to 
any individual is precluded.
Where legislation has failed to define the relationship between the public entity 
and the public, one looks to the common law to determine whether a duty of care is 
owed before tortious liability can be pursued against the public sector. Cooper 
articulates the appropriate test for finding a common law duty of care. McLachlin 
CJ.C. and Major J., writing for the Court, revisited the Anns test44 for determining 
whether a statutory regulator owes a private law duty of care to members of the 
investing public for (alleged) negligence in failing to properly oversee the conduct of 
an investment company licensed by it. The SCC affirmed existing common law 
categories where a duty of care has been recognized -  directing litigants to first 
determine whether their case falls into one of these categories or an analogous one. 
Where the duty does not fall within a recognized category of recovery, the Court 
must consider whether there is a relationship of proximity and reasonable 
foreseeability of harm which, if established, gives rise to a prima facie duty of care; 
and whether any overriding broader policy considerations might negate this duty. 
Policy considerations are also important, the SCC found, for determining requisite 
proximity (that the defendant is in a close and direct relationship to the plaintiff such 
that it is just to impose a duty of care in the circumstance).
For example, a policy consideration that traditionally has negated a tortious 
duty of care is the belief that regulatory governance requires freedom to regulate 
without threat of liability for policy decisions. Thus, for example, there would be no 
liability for whether road maintenance is undertaken (a policy decision based on 
allocation of scarce resources) but where a policy for road maintenance is adopted,
42 Cooper v. Hobart [2001], 3 S.C.R. 537 [Cooper].
43 Ibid. at para. 43, the Court provides that “[i]n this case, the statute does not impose a duty of care on 
the Registrar to investors with mortgage brokers regulated by the Act. The Registrar’s duty is rather to 
the public as a whole. Indeed, a duty to individual investors would potentially conflict with the 
Registrar’s overarching duty to the public.”
44 See Anns v. Longon Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.). The decision “highlights and hones the 
role of policy concerns in determining the scope of liability for negligence.” See ibid. at para. 1.
45 Cooper, ibid. at para. 39.
there is an existing duty of care to ensure that it is not negligently performed.46 
Similarly, there would be no tortious liability for a policy decision finding genes to 
be patentable inventions based on the CPO’s interpretation of patent legislation, so 
long as the patent is not negligently granted; that is, so long as the statutory 
requirements of patentability are met. This is the classic policy/operationalization 
dichotomy in tort law wherein the Crown has historically enjoyed immunity for the 
former on the basis that policy decisions necessarily entail financial, economic, 
social and political factors better left to the discretion of our elected representatives. 
In Chaoulli, the dissent emphasized this point, stating that “the resolution of such a 
complex fact-laden policy debate does not fit easily within the institutional 
competence or procedures of courts of law.”47
If the patent office has assumed a de facto policy for granting gene patents, the 
first and most obvious basis for attacking gene patents is with respect to the statute’s 
standards for patentability and their application by the CPO. An individual can 
claim that the statutory requirements for patents are being carelessly applied in 
relation to gene patent applications such that the artificial scarcity detrimentally 
affecting public health should never, by doctrinal standards, have been created. We 
know that in the private law of torts, “a government actor may be liable in 
negligence for the manner in which it executes or carries out the policy.”48 Such an 
attack against a decision by the Canadian Patent Office/Commissioner could be 
made on at least six different grounds under the Act and should ideally be coupled 
with a concurrent challenge to patent validity: 1) genes are not properly patentable 
subject matter; 2) they lack novelty -  there is nothing “new” about the gene just 
because our ability to isolate them was newly found; 3) they lack an inventive step 
(they are not non-obvious) especially since the isolation of the gene is now routinely 
done by automated computing; 4) utility (more helpful if the issue is over patented 
Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) or DNA sequences of no known current utility); 5) 
sufficiency of the patent specification; and 6) incomplete disclosure of the existing 
prior art or alternatively a lax understanding of the person with ordinary skill in the 
art.49 The person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) in patent law is very
46 See Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 [Just]', Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney 
General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445. See also ibid. at para. 36.
47 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 164.
48 Cooper, supra note 42 at para. 38.
49 See e.g. L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, “Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?”, 17 Berkley Tech. L.J. 
(2002) 1155 at 1191, online: <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=349761> at 2-3 where they state:
The more skill those in the art have, the less information a patentee has to disclose 
to meet the enablement requirement~but the harder it is to meet the nonobviousness 
requirement. The level of skill in the art affects not just patent validity, but also 
patent scope. One reading of the biotechnology and computer software cases is that 
the Federal Circuit believes computer programmers are extremely skilled, while 
biotechnology experts know very little about their art.... We do not challenge the 
idea that the standards in each industry should vary with the level of the skill in that 
industry....[T]he use of the PHOSITA provides needed flexibility for patent law, 
permitting it to adapt to new technologies without losing its essential character.”
much like the reasonable person in tort law -  an ever-elusive fictional person 
creating a nebulous legal standard. Much of the legal variance in patent standards is 
attributable to the use of this legal construct to determine obviousness and 
enablement.
Even if one were able to locate a PHOSITA, as David Vaver notes, the meaning 
of the patent is ultimately a question of law to be “decided by a judge who usually is 
not skilled in any art or science, let alone the relevant one.”50 That patents have been 
extended to life by judicial fiat is an apt example of this.51 Moreover, judges have 
complained, on more than one occasion, of the linguistic ambiguity in claim 
drafting52 and that it compounds the existing difficulty in understanding the 
boundaries to technologically specific and often complex inventions. The claims 
draw a fence separating what is privatized under the patent from that which remains 
in the public domain. But there are other problems related to the desire to maximize 
this enclosure. What some call “kitchen sink” patents,53 others refer to as “reach 
through claims” to describe the tendency of the patentee to claim overly broadly- to 
reach through the invention -  to privately enclose more than that which is invented 
and disclosed.54
Reach through claims are anti-competitive and reflect the patentee’s desire to 
demarcate as much of the market as possible in a particular field of technology as 
falling within his or her legal rights. The patentee’s spot is ‘reserved’ for later and 
broader applications of the technology than actually disclosed. Suppose, for 
example, that I have invented X. Claim one in my patent would be abstracted to the 
broadest possible interpretation of what the invention is -  the whole of an alphabet 
comprised of letters, which contains my X. If we consider genetic sequences as the 
alphabet coding for words (genes) in the “book of life”, the danger with patenting the 
alphabet as a whole, or any of its letters, is more readily apparent. Unlike linguistic 
alphabets which are culturally constructed, genes are our common heritage; our 
endowment from nature; they are not “invented.” Because genes are information and
50 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 27 at 140.
51 See Bita Amani & Rosemary Coombe, “The Human Genome Diversity Project: The Politics of 
Patents at the Intersection of Race, Religion, and Research Ethics” (2005) 27:1 Law & Policy 152.
52 See Xerox of Canada Ltd. v. I.B.M. Canada Ltd. (1977), 33 C.P.R. 24 at 88, n. 14, where the judge 
complained that claims such as the one before the court passed from “riddle to enigma” -  the claim to 
collect used toner from photocopiers was a sentence made of 178 words with little punctuation. See 
also the 281 word claim also held valid after a nine day trial despite some earlier proclaimed doubts by 
the judge during interlocutory proceedings. Risi Stone Ltd. v. Groupe Permacon Inc. (1990), 29 
C.P.R. (3d) 243 at 247-48 (F.C.T.D.) rev’d (1995), 65 C.P.R. (3d) 2 at 9 (F.C.T.D.).
53 See Kevin Rivette & David Kline, Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the Hidden Value of Patents 
(Boston: HBS Press, 1999) at 21 which get their name “because they [the patents] sometimes appear to 
be asserting ownership of everything under the sun.. .”
54 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Reaching Through the Human Genome” (Keynote address presented to 
the Fifth Annual Technology and Intellectual Property Group Conference entitled, Dual Controversies 
of the Double Helix: Challenges of Regulating the Information and Property Aspects of Genetic 
Technology, at the University of Toronto, February 2004)
not true “inventions”, there are no viable substitutes. Even if we concede that 
genetic information can be characterized as “invention” on the basis of labour alone, 
my claim to the alphabet subsuming my invention X if granted, worse yet, gives me 
a patent lottery because it reaches through to provide me with legal rights more 
expansive than for what I actually invented. That is what Myriad did with its 
BRCA1 and 2 diagnostic test patents.
Attacking patentability based on faulty application of statutory requirements 
was used against Myriad’s BRCA 1 /2 gene patent and diagnostic testing patent in 
France and later Europe to challenge patent validity. What was first a dispute 
between the Institut Curie and Myriad eventually spilled over into all of Europe and 
involved the French government and European Parliament. The problem of gene 
patenting was further compounded by the over-broad nature of Myriad’s claims 
which, by assuming a monopoly on all BRCA 1 and 2 related genetic tests and the 
genes against which such tests were developed, effectively limited alternative and 
possibly more accurate genetic testing. The Institut Curie, the Assistance Publique- 
Hopitaux de Paris and the Institut Gustave-Roussy filed an opposition notice with the 
European Patent Office (EPO) which, following public hearings on May 17 and 18 
2004, resulted in revocation Myriad’s patent on BRCAnalysis. The Canadian Cancer 
society reports in relation to Myriad’s BRCA patents that since the EPO “has not yet 
issued a written discussion that describes the specific reasons it revoked this 
patent.. .it is difficult to know what impact this will have, if any, in Canada.”55
However, using patent law to attack validity may prove cumbersome and not 
entirely satisfactory. First, the costs are too extensive to be borne routinely by 
private litigants. Consider some general statistics available from the American 
context. The United States Patent Office (USPTO) grants approximately 75% of all 
patent applications. Courts invalidate some 46% of litigated patent claims. Only a 
negligible 2% of patents, however, are litigated and “less than two-tenths of one 
percent of all issued patents actually go to court.”56 The costs of a full trial through 
to an appeal might approximate $1.5 million dollars for each party according to a 
study by Mark Lemley.57 The high cost may be manageable as between private 
corporate firms who attack patent validity as a means of defending against a patent 
infringement suit, but is not a viable option for individual citizens seeking to correct 
a patent roster of all its “bad patents”. Second, there are far too many gene patents to 
challenge on a case by case basis and such a remedial approach does little to 
contribute to public health in a participatory and anticipatory manner. Moreover, it 
is an inefficient use of judicial and private resources considering the total number of 
gene patents that have issued and continue to issue impacting on human health.
55 See Canadian Cancer Society, “Background on the patenting of BRCA1 and 2 genes”, online: 
<http://www.cancer.ca/ccs/intemet/standard/0,3182,3172 31282995_32749610_langld-en,00.html>.
56 John R. Allison & Mark A.Lemley, “Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents” (1998) 
at 208, online: < http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l 18149>.
57 Mark Lemley, “Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office” (2001) 95:4 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495 at 1501-02 
[Lemley, “Rational Ignorance”].
According to the National Geographic, more than 4,000 of the approximately 
24,000 human genes have been claimed in U.S. patents.58 That is to say, 20% of the 
human genome has been patented; of these approximately 63% are assigned to 
private firms as compared to 28% to universities.5 Yet, “the functions are unknown 
for over 50% of discovered genes.”60 Where the functions are unknown, there is a 
faulty “operational” decision because the patentee has failed to establish and disclose 
a clear “utility” as required by patent law -  making the CPO’s grant of those patents 
negligent. Attacking gene patents by seeking to impose public authority liability 
through tort law is also piecemeal and remedial at best targeting one gene patent 
grant at a time, much like invalidity proceedings do, with the additional scope for 
claiming monetary damages. The availability of tort actions does not impact what is 
now a de facto patent office policy for granting gene patents or eliminate the need for 
cross-policy coordination between the ministries of health and industry. If the patent 
is revoked under patent law, that gives a strong indication that there was a breach of 
the standard of care in an operational decision of a crown agent (in granting the 
patent in the first place) which may open up liability in tort depending on whether 
the plaintiff is able to discharge the burden of proof on the remaining elements for 
the tort of Negligence.
58 What is patented in the USA is routinely patented in other major industrialized countries and secures 
priority rights for doing so.
59 Stefan Lovgren, “One-Fifth of Human Genes Have Been Patented, Study Reveals” National 
Geographic News, (15 October 2005) online: <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/10/ 
1013 051013_gene_patent ,html>.
60 Humae Genome Project, “The Science Behind the Human Genome Project”, online: 
<http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/info.shtml> [emphasis added]. These 
statistics informed California Congressman Xavier Becerra’s recent proposal of new legislation to ban 
human genetic patenting (U.S., Bill H.R. 977, Genomic Research and Accountability Act, 100th Cong. 
2007 to Amend Title 35, United States Code), online: 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlcll0/h977_ih.xml>. In his introductory speech before Congress 
in February 2007, Becerra implored:
I rise today with the hope of fixing what I believe to be a regulatory mistake-a 
mistake that at first glance may seem minor in scope, but upon further examination 
has dramatic, costly and harmful implications for every American. I speak of the 
practice of gene patenting, where private corporations, universities and even the 
Federal Government are granted a monopoly by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office on significant sections of the human genome... It is my belief 
that this practice is wrong, ill-conceived and stunts scientific advancement... My 
legislation, the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, is straightforward: it ends 
the practice of gene patenting. It gives guidance to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) on what is not patentable-in this case, genetic material, 
naturally-occurring or modified. It is not retroactive-it does not rescind the patents 
already issued... We have overstepped our bounds. We have made a regulatory 
m istake. We have allowed the patenting of a product of nature. Fortunately, we 
have the power to end the practice expeditiously and for the benefit of all.
See Library of Congress, (U.S., Cong. Rec., daily ed., at E315 (9 February 2007) (Rep. Becerra)), 
online: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D7rl 10:60:./temp/ ~rl 10KYJQHb::>.
So far we have considered patent invalidity proceedings in addition to the 
private law duty of care: the first element for the tort of Negligence. If we could not 
proceed by way of an existing or analogous category of a duty of care consideration 
of a new duty would entail broader policy questions which, in Cooper, included 
considering the spectre of indeterminate liability and whether it would “loom large if 
a duty of care was recognized”. Additionally, Cooper instructs us to consider the 
impact of the duty on taxpayers. Governments are self insurers. “To impose a duty 
of care in these circumstances would be to effectively create an insurance 
scheme.. .at great cost to the taxpaying public.”61
To summarize, both a categorically recognized duty and a new prima facie duty 
of care would be problematic. A new duty would likely be negated by policy 
considerations. And, even if a categorical duty has been recognized, a terminally ill 
plaintiff would have difficulty proving on a balance of probabilities the remaining 
elements of the tort. She would have to establish that causation, remoteness, and 
damages relate to the grant of the patent in order to discharge her burden for 
imposing tort liability. Consequently, as applied to a faulty operational decision of a 
public authority the private law approach is uncertain and unlikely to succeed. 
Additionally, even if gene patents were expressly allowed by legislation, the Crown 
would not be liable in tort for resulting harms. Legislators have traditionally been 
immune from tort liability because legislative decisions are characterized as pure 
policy decisions and do not give rise to a private duty of care on the part of 
governments. Similarly, there would be no public sector liability for legislative 
omission for the failure to ban gene patents or to exclude them from patentability. 
Abstract theorem and scientific principles are expressly excluded under s. 27(8) of 
the CPA for rationales that would equally apply to genetic information: these are 
public goods necessary for basic science and research.
Gene patents could be excluded for public policy reasons. The Manual of 
Patent Office Practice (MOPOP) s. 16.02 protects public health interest by 
rearticulating a common law exception to patentability: “subject matter related to a 
process of surgery or therapy on living humans or animals is not considered to be 
within the scope of ‘invention’ as defined by s. 2 of the Patent Act.”62 Another 
option would be to establish a body similar to the Patented Medicines Prices Review 
Board which attempts to reach a compromise position between the interests of 
pharmacutical companies investing in drug research and development and individual 
need for access to medicine. These are effective means of achieving cross-policy 
coordination objectives even though consideration of health or other moral issues are 
irrelevant considerations for the CPO’s determination of patentability under the 
CPA. Jurisprudence makes clear that there is no duty of care owed in the common 
law for policy decisions of the crown and its agents. In Cooper, the SCC expounds: 
“It is established that government actors are not liable in negligence for policy 
decisions, but only operational decisions. The basis of this immunity is that policy is
61 Cooper, supra note 42 at para. 56.
62 Manual of Patent Office Practice, supra note 30.
the prerogative of the elected Legislature. It is inappropriate for courts to impose 
liability for the consequences of a particular policy decision.”63 This was the legal 
landscape until Chaoulli and it meant that faulty (negligent) policy decisions causing 
harm were immune from tortious liability. However, the CPO may also be 
considered to be acting unconstitutionally if they have overstepped the legitimate 
boundaries of the interpretation of patentable subject matter or misapplied the 
requirements for patentability and “invention”.
In Chaoulli, the SCC found that “when the courts are given the tools they need 
to make a decision, they should not hesitate to assume their responsibilities. 
Deference cannot lead to the judicial branch to abdicate its role in favour of the 
legislative branch or the executive branch.”64 Therefore, the same set of facts that 
give rise to tort action may independently give rise to Charter-based damages 
claims.65 The result is that social policies which are careless (negligent) and 
disregard the Charter impact on those foreseeably harmed, or are otherwise wrongful 
in breaching a constitutional right, can be the subject of public sector liability under 
the Charter, just as a standard of care based on custom or common practice can give 
rise to a negligence claim in tort if that custom or practice was itself negligent.66 
The two claims are not co-dependent however and it is not necessary to establish a 
basis of liability in tort in order to bring a Charter claim. To the contrary, the latter 
may be particularly helpful to address situations in which tort liability may seem 
untenable.
One might argue, then, that Chaoulli is not about the narrow issue of public or 
private delivery of health services but rather that anytime the Charter creates a 
regulatory scheme (whether for granting patents or delivering healthcare), it must 
comply with the Charter such that a failure to do so -  a breach of the requisite 
standard of care in tort terms -  is, in relation to s. 7 rights, unconstitutional. In other 
words, Chaoulli supports a parallel form of public sector liability based on a 
“constitutional tort” of regulatory negligence. The majority in Chaoulli confirmed 
this, finding that, “if the government chooses to act, it must do so properly.”67 This 
broad rule is consistent with s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which requires that 
all of the laws of Canada conform with the Constitution.
63 Cooper, supra note 42 at para. 38.
64 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 87.
65 Nelles v. The Queen, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) 
Commissioners of Police (1989) 58 D.L.R. (4th) 396 (Ont. H.C.), affirmed (1990) 74 O.R. (2d) 225 
(Ont. Div. Ct). at 230, leave to appeal refused (1991), 1 O.R. (3d) 416 (note) (Ont. C.A.). The damages 
recovered may be limited to one or the other action.
66 ter Nuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674.
67 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 158. One obvious criticism of this premise is that the government 
then may simply chose not to act and thereby avoid liability entirely. I do not believe that the 
disincentive argument is compelling since there are political reasons governments may act and often 
those short term political reasons are not congruent with adverse economic outcomes but are 
imperative nonetheless.
An emerging constitutional tort for regulatory negligence may be found in the 
earlier SCC decision of Vriend68 where the enactment of the Individual Rights 
Protection Act (IRPA) fell under Charter scrutiny for excluding sexual orientation as 
a prohibited ground of discrimination. This legislative “omission” offended the 
Charter’s guarantee of equality rights and warranted review. As human rights 
legislation, to make it consistent with Charter principles, the IPRA required that the 
protection coverage be complete and inclusive of a specific group deliberately 
excluded from its protection but historically targeted by the discrimination the 
legislation was passed to address. Vriend highlights two key points. First, legislative 
omissions can draw Charter scrutiny even if they are precluded from similar scrutiny 
in the private law of tort due to their characterization as “policy”. Second, if 
Parliament acts to create a regulatory scheme, that scheme must meet minimal 
standards of care. That is, it must not violate enumerated Charter rights.
In Chaoulli, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. posited that “[t]he courts have a 
duty to rise above political debate. They leave it to the legislatures to develop social 
policy. But when such social policies infringe rights that are protected by the 
charters, the courts cannot shy away from considering them.” Where policy 
decisions affect constitutional Charter rights, even if legislated, the Court can assert 
its jurisdiction to address the resulting harm and need not defer to governments. S. 
52 of the Constitution states that the Charter is the supreme law of the land. 
Regulatory schemes, whether our regime for public health delivery (confirmed in 
Chaoulli) or for granting patent protection as argued here, must thereby comply with 
Charter principles as well as our international obligations under human rights 
instruments.70 Having determined that the Charter applies, the next step in a 
constitutional challenge to the CPO’s grant of gene patents is to determine whether 
any Charter rights have been violated. To make this determination, we must ask: Is 
there a constitutional right to health and if so, was it infringed?
P a r t  2: C o n stit u t io n a l izin g  H e a l t h : T h e  P r o g r e ssiv e  a n d  
In d iv isib l e  C h a r a c t e r  o f  H u m a n  R ig h t s
Kirsten Hastrup suggests that:
68 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
69 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 89.
70 See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. L’Heureux- 
Dubé J. wrote at paras. 69-70:
International treaties and conventions are not part of Canadian law unless they have 
been implemented by statute... I agree with the respondent and the Court of Appeal 
that the Convention has not been implemented by Parliament. Its provisions 
therefore have no direct application within Canadian law. Nevertheless, the values 
reflected in international human rights law may help inform the contextual approach 
to statutory interpretation and judicial review.
[rjights are what unite us, as attributed to us by the global imagined 
community, glued together not by a sense of tradition and a shared past 
but by a hope for the future and a universal currency of rights.. .which 
now functions as the legitimate representation of a global moral 
economy.71
Under the 1945 United Nations Charter (UNC), the Economic and Social 
Council was bom as the principal UN organ and was given a broad mandate 
pertaining to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related 
matters. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) set out “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”73 without drawing 
a distinction or establishing a priority between civil and political rights, and 
economic, cultural and social rights. The UDHR has served as the model for 
codifying human right protection in multilateral conventions, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 74 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) at 
least one of which most States are signatory to. The Vienna Declaration of 1993 
reaffirms not only the universality of human right but their indivisibility, 
interdependence, and interrelation while acknowledging the need to consider 
diversity amidst universalizing ambitions.76
Human rights recognize the equal entitlements of individuals as their subject 
but do not assure equality amongst the rights recognized. The preamble to the 
UDHR provides “equal...rights of all members of the human family.” Yet, some 
rights allow for progressive realization, limits, restrictions, and optional protocols or 
reservations, while others (such as political and civil rights proclaimed under the 
ICCPR) are more absolute and immediate. The fact that an internal hierarchy of
71 See Kirsten Hastrup, ed., Legal Cultures and Human Rights: The Challenge of Diversity (New York: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 15.
72 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7. arts. 62-72,
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN 
Doc. A/810 (1948) [UDHR]. As a resolution of the UN General Assembly, it was not binding per se, 
but became the foundation for much of the later codified and customary international human rights 
law. See Hannum Hurst, “The UDHR in National and International Law” (1998) 3:2 Health & Hum. 
Rts. 145.
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.TS. 171, Can. T.S. 
1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) 
[ICCPR].
75 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A(XXI), UN GAOR, 
Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR].
76 Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 157/24 (1993). Article 5 provides: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a 
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis... [I]t is the duty of States.. .to 
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” See also Article 6 of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, annex, 41 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 53 at 
186, UN Doc. A//41/53 (1986).
rights may exist does not in any way diminish their solidarity or indivisibility.77 
Economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCRs) tend to be qualified by the availability 
of government resources and therefore the ICESCR allows for their progressive 
implementation.78 Eide and Rosas have argued, however, that “fundamental needs 
should not be at the mercy of changing governmental policies and programmes, but 
should be defined as entitlements.”79 The duty on the state cannot be invoked 
directly in domestic legal forums so the challenge with ESCRs is to encourage 
governments to give them content and thereby concrete legal relevance; some 
governments are simply ambivalent to do so80 even though arguably, “human rights 
most urgently need asserting and defending, both theoretically and practically, where 
they are most denied.”81
In 1950, the General Assembly adopted a resolution emphasizing the 
interdependence of all human rights and called on the UN Commission on Human 
Rights to adopt a single convention that would be legally binding on ratifying 
States.82 However, under the influence of Western States in the following year, the 
Commission reversed its decision and created the twin covenants for civil and 
political rights (ICCPR) and for social, economic, and cultural rights (ICESR). The
77 Some advocate the full recognition of socio-economic rights but reject the view of a hierarchy. See 
discussion in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 [Gosselin (SCC)]. In 
Gosselin the court offers four main problems with social and economic rights. Since they are 
programmatic, they 1) do not provide for full benefits for those who participate in the program; 2) the 
design of the programs was not tailored in such a way as to ensure that there would always be 
programs available to those who want to participate; 3) the implementation of the programs present 
still more hurdles to overcome; 4) the government determines the availability of the program; at paras. 
277-83.
78 Article 2.1 of the ICESCR, supra note 75 provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
See also related General Comment 3 contained in 5th Sess., art. 2, para. 1, UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1990) 
[ICESCR, General Comment 3].
79 See Asbjem Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas, eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Textbook (Canada: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995) at 18.
80 The United States, for example, has not yet ratified the ICESCR and Canada, although having ratified 
the ICESCR, has not followed the government of South Africa in taking the additional step to 
expressly legislate the protection of these as positive rights within its Constitution.
81 See David Beetham, “What Future for Economic and Social Rights” in Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, 
eds., International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics, Moralsx 2d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 249 at 255. The author suggest that human rights advocates and proponents of 
development economics can find common ground “...on a minimum core of rights such as... the right 
to food of an adequate nutritional value, to clothing, to shelter, to basic (or primary) health care, clean 
water and sanitation...” at 256.
82 Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation: Future Work of the 
Commission on Human Rights, GA Res. 421(V), UN GAOR, 5th Sess. (1950).
development of two instruments is an artifact of the political economy at the time 
and does detract from the normative interrelation of all human rights. The Preamble 
to the ICESCR mirrors that of the ICCPR, and both provide that:
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy 
his economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil and political 
rights.83
Without a mechanism for individuals to hold their governments accountable for 
the protection of their human rights, the ICESCRs are no more than mere statements 
of aspiration84 even though all human rights are fundamental to a life of human 
dignity and dependent on the state for their realization, “with the net effect that the 
breach of one will affect the realization of another.”85
1. Justiciability: Manufacturing Rights From Ideals
Most major UN human rights treaties, or their related protocols, provide state 
undertakings to accept the oversight of specialized international supervisory 
committees (such as the Human Rights Committee which monitors compliance with 
the ICCPR) known as treaty bodies in order to ensure compliance with treaty 
obligations -  with the exception of the Committee on ESCRs, established by 
ECOSOC under Resolution 1985/17 rather than by a treaty and monitors state 
compliance with the ICESCR.86 Under the ICCPR, there is some provision for use 
of an inter-state complaint mechanism (under Art. 41, optional declaration but no 
state has filed one to date) and for individual complaint and petition mechanisms 
(under ICCPR-OP1). But, neither of these are available internationally under the 
ICESCR. Simply put, you cannot enforce your individual right to health in an 
international forum. Therefore justiciability, the ability to have an international 
human rights claim judicially determined, relies on domestic mechanisms. Unlike 
customary international law, which is automatically binding and like the common 
law needs no further domestic statutory incorporation, other international treaty 
norms require domestic implementation in order to be justiciable; it is domestic law 
that provides for a legal remedy. However, just as there is a presumption that all
83 ICESCR, supra note 75 [emphasis added].
84 See ICESCR, General Comment 3, supra note 78 at para. 5: “Any suggestion that the provisions 
indicated are inherently non-self-executing would seem to be difficult to sustain.”
85 Rhona K.M. Smith & Christien van den Anker, eds., The Essentials of Human Rights (London: Hodder 
Arnold, 2006) at 37, see also Amyrta Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) observing that no substantial famine in the last fifty 
years has occurred in a state with a democratic form of government and free press.
86 Article 16 of the ICESCR requires states to submit periodic reports to the UN Secretary General. Each 
body is comprised of state elected expert members and are responsible for four different procedures: 1) 
the review of periodic reports submitted by state parties; 2) investigation of systemic violations; 3) 
review of petitions filed by one state against another; and 4) and review of petition made by 
individuals against states parties. Smith & van den Anker, ibid., at 385.
domestic law will conform with our Constitution,87 there is a presumption that 
Canadian law conforms with international treaty obligations such that even in the 
absence of domestic implementing legislation, “while a litigant may not be able to 
place direct reliance on a right guaranteed by a Canadian treaty obligation, she is 
permitted to raise that right and rely on it for the purposes of interpreting a domestic 
provision.”88
Civil and political rights are considered justiciable in that they are generally 
more easily applied by courts and require only restraint from intrusion on these 
negatively defined “freedoms” (‘freedom from’). Conversely, social and economic 
rights have traditionally posed some problems for justiciability and have therefore 
been considered “programmatic” and subject to the politics of public policy 
(‘freedom to’). One approach consistent with the Vienna Declaration is to 
incorporate ESCRs protection within domestic constitutional rights protecting civil 
and political liberties. The right to food and health, for example, may be subsumed 
within a right to life and security of the person.89 Such an approach reaffirms the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights. Ideally, constitutional 
protection for ECSRs would be as express as civil and political rights and require 
positive baselines to be delivered by public authorities along with the negative 
freedoms and liberties. South Africa’s 1996 Constitution, however, remains virtually 
alone in this approach.90
In other contexts, domestic implementing legislation may open the door for 
interpreting government measures to be compatible with international human rights 
obligations. K.D. Ewing, writing about the UK Human Rights Act of 1998 [UK Act], 
argues that if domestic legislation is incompatible with Convention rights, a higher 
court is empowered under implementing legislation to declare incompatability. 
However, the duty to construe legislation to comply with Convention rights is 
imposed on all courts. In addition, Ewing argues the UK Act imposes an obligation 
on public authorities to comply with Convention rights and this obligation is directly 
enforceable in domestic courts. Summarizing the view of the Lord Chancellor, 
Ewing writes that the courts have a duty of acting compatibly with the convention 
not only in relation to cases involving public authorities but also in deciding cases 
between private citizens such that “Convention rights may be relied upon in
87 Hogg, Consitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., supra note 35 at 286.
88 Mark Freeman & Gib van Ert, International Human Rights Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) at 350-51.
89 The ICCPR, supra note 74, can be applied to protect economic, social and cultural rights reflecting an 
accepted interdependence between the twin instruments. In addition to the numerous text references 
supporting this position, the Human Rights Committee charged with monitoring state compliance with 
the ICCPR decided in Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990), Comm. No. 167/1984, that ICCPR 
(Article 27) protects the right of persons to engage in economic and social activities that are part of the 
culture of the community to which they belong such that the expropriation of 10,000 square kilometers 
of land by the Alberta government for use by oil and gas interests violated an Aboriginal groups right 
to engage in protected economic and cultural activities. Query whether the granting of a gene patent is 
an analogous “taking”.
90 Constitution o f the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996.
litigation between private parties, but cannot themselves be the basis of a cause of 
action.”91 Rosemary Coombe echoes this position:
The States’ obligation to protect involve duties to prevent abuse of rights 
by third parties, including non-State actors, whereas obligations to fulfill 
involve active duties to take appropriate measures that create a framework 
for creating accountability.92
According to Ewing’s and Coombe’s analysis, these human rights, and their 
corresponding duties, could be raised as a defence to domestic actions for patent 
infringement or validity proceedings between private parties and even by the 
government to defend against patent infringement actions (if for example a 
government was sued by Myriad). However, the case by case, defensive nature of 
this approach makes it less than ideal for effecting patent policy changes, as well as 
protecting the underlying human right. According to CERA,93 the Canadian 
government is increasingly criticized by the United Nations human rights bodies for 
its failure to ensure the realization of social and economic rights for all Canadians.94 
Of course, there are good reasons for governments to prioritize industrial and trade 
policy over health policy- to date, the risk of liability in domestic and international 
law and the simple cost of defending a patent infringement action was sufficient 
incentive especially since there are no similar costs associated for disregarding the 
individual’s right to the highest attainable standard of health. If the “right to health” 
has acquired constitutional status an individual could possibly sue public authorities 
for granting patents in breach of her human rights and seek Charter damages, a 
declaration of invalidity and perhaps even a moratorium on gene patents being issued 
by the CPO until Parliament acts through legislation.95 The provision of Charter 
remedies will act as an incentive, one would hope, for policy change.
91 See K.D. Ewing, “The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy” (1999) 62 Mod. L. Rev. 79 
in Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, eds., International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 1010.
92 Rosemary Coombe, “Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in 
Tntftmational Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of 
Biodiversity” (1998) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59 at 68.
93 The Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation, online: <http://www.equalityrights. 
org/cera/index.cfm?nav+prog&sub=escr>.
94 In 1993 and 1998, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -  which 
monitors Canada’s compliance with its ESCRs obligations -  criticized Canada for its poor record of 
upholding these rights. The Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation, online: 
<http://www.equalityrights.org/cera/>. In May 2006, Canada underwent another review. An advance 
unedited version of the UNCESR Review (May 1-19, 2006), future E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 is available 
online: <http://www.ohchr.Org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/E.C.12.CAN.CO.5.pdf>. It criticizes Canada 
for not doing enough to address social and economic rights such as food shortages, poverty, and 
homelessness as well as for the absence of an official poverty line.
95 See discussion of a declaration as a possible remedy under s. 24 of the Charter in Little Sisters, supra 
note 33.
2. The Human Right to Health
The right to health is a fundamental human right recognized in international 
instruments administered under the auspices of the United Nations. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) -  a specialized UN agency established in 1948 for the 
attainment of the highest available standard of health for all people96 -  recognizes 
human health as integral to the “happiness, harmonious relations and security of all 
peoples” and therefore defines health holistically in its Constitution as, “a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.”97 WHO also stresses the importance of state responsibility for 
ensuring the protection of health, the need for state co-operation because health is a 
global public good which creates positive spillover effects for the rest of the world, 
and the essential right of each individual for the full realization of the highest 
available standard without discrimination based on the ability to pay (“economic or 
social condition”). Since health is part of one’s overall wellbeing, it is integral to 
and subsumed within the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and their 
silent companion, human dignity. Article 25 of the 1948 UDHR reflects the 
confluence of human rights:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services...
The ICESCR imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure that these human 
rights are met. Article 11 recognizes the
right of everyone to an adequate standard o f living for himself and his 
family, including adequate food...and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions...99,[State Parties] shall take, individually and through 
international co-operation, the measures...needed...by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge...100
The right to health is internationally recognized as a fundamental human right 
regardless of its classification as part of our ESCRs or as civil and political rights.
3. Does Canada protect the human right to health?
96 This right set out in Article 12 of the ICESCR, supra note 75, and provides that state parties recognize 
“the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”
97 Constitution of the World Health Organization, online: About WHO in SEAR 
<http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/About_SEARO_const.pdf>.
98 UDHR, supra note 73.
99 “[P]arties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.” ICESCR, supra note 75.
100 Ibid. [emphasis added].
Canadian constitutional law expressly protects key civil and political rights. Social 
and economic rights, unfortunately, have not garnered the same express protection. 
Historically, claims suggesting that they are implicitly subsumed within and 
indivisible from Charter freedoms have failed. Canada is signatory to these treaties 
and has ratified both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. In principle, Canada does 
recognize and is committed to the right to health as articulated in international 
human rights instruments. A patchwork of legislation strives to meet this obligation 
to protect health. The Canada Health A ctm  recognizes the need for public 
administration of a health care insurance plan that is comprehensive, universal, 
portable, and accessible. For a more effective system of public health, Colleen Flood 
and Sujit Choudry suggest public administration be expanded to include public 
governance and accountability as this will capture a needed element of “democratic 
accountability: how to ensure that the State, and decision makers empowered by it, 
take responsibility for the decisions they make, and are accountable in a fair and 
more direct and timely manner than is possible through elections every four or five 
years.”102 Constitutionalizing the right to health creates an additional platform for 
increasing democratic accountability for administrative decisions. The full 
protection of the right to health domestically very much relies on this right achieving 
constitutional status103 and thereby rendering the international human right to health 
domestically justiciable through this new framework for governmental 
accountability.
Human health is not an expressly guaranteed right under the Charter even 
though public health issues are a priority within national, regional, cultural, political, 
and economic agendas. While the delivery of health typically falls within Provincial 
jurisdiction over property and civil rights,104 the provinces are restrained by federal 
objectives conditioned on funding transfers (Canada Health and Social Transfer) as 
part of the shared-cost programmes within each province. This unique relationship 
makes inter-govemmental co-operation and collaboration imperative for the viability
101 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [Health Act].
102 Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Strengthening the Foundations: Modernizing the 
Canada Health Act (Discussion Paper No. 13) by Colleen M. Flood & Sujit Choudhry (August 2002) 
at 7.
103 For persuasive arguments in favour of a constitutionalized right, see Martha Jackman, “Constitutional 
Jurisdiction Over Health in Canada” (2000) 8 Health L.J. 95 [Jackman, “Consitutional Jurisdiction”].
104 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
[Constituion Act, 1867]. The grant of provincal authority over hospitals is established through s. 
92(7). Under s. 92(13), power over health is included in the provincial property and civil rights, and 
under s. 92(16) as a matter of local and private nature. However, health can also fall under the federal 
power under s. 91(27) for criminal law aspects of health (criminal regulation of food and drugs) 
punishing conduct dangerous to health, within the general jurisdiction of the peace, order and good 
government federal power if the health problem has national dimension (such as the spread of 
epidemics like water pollution, pestilence, and SARS or the Anthrax scare) and in relation to labour 
relation standards under the federal jurisdiction. Essentially, the question of jurisdiction depends on 
“the purpose and effect of the particular health measure in issue.” See Hogg, Consitutional Law of 
Canada, 3rd ed., supra note 35 at 476.
and internal coherence of the Canadian health care system.105 Patent regulation is 
expressly granted to federal parliament under s. 91(22) of the Constitution Act,106 
making policy co-ordination between two jurisdictions and two separate ministries — 
provincial health regulation and federal industrial property regulation -  all the more 
difficult. The situation continues despite the growing number of reports indicating 
the lack of co-ordination between health and industrial policy is a shameful 
worldwide phenomenon in need of immediate attention.107
It may be said that a strong patent system furthers the right to health by creating 
incentives for research and development and the early disclosure of inventions. 
However, there is no express evidence that the patent system is operating effectively 
to this end nor that alternative systems of reward could not be as effective. 108 
Moreover, the negative impact on health and the economic costs of gene patents to 
society are not as apparent in the short term as the economic gains are further 
obscuring motivations for governments to (re)act. And, health lobbyists have hardly 
had a voice matching in tenor and volume with that of industry lobby, and therefore 
have failed to capture the ear of politicians in the same way; at least not in terms of 
priority in cross-policy co-ordination. According to Alison Brysk:
private profit-making actors control citizens’ lives and distort public 
decision-making in a variety of ways...In a more structural way, private 
economic interests may shape the rules and roles of governance -  
regardless of whether they influence a particular decision... [MJarket 
actors may dominate political life through shaping knowledge and 
consciousness of what is possible and desirable.109
105 See National Forum on Health, Canada Health Action : Building on the Legacy -  Final Report of the 
National Forum on Health (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997) at 20; 
Auditor General of Canada, Report o f the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, 1999 
(Ottawa; Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1999) c. 29 at 19. See Martha 
Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction” supra note 103.
106 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104.
107 See William R. Cornish, M. Llewelyn & M. Adcock, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and 
Genetics:A Study into the Impact and Management of Intellectual Property Rights within the 
Healthcare Sector (Cambridge: Public Health Genetics Unit, 2003), online: 
<www.phgu.org.uk/about_phgu/resources/word/s-iprl.doO; The Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
Discussion Paper, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (July 2002), online: http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org 
/publications/pp_0000000014.asp; The European Commission’s Report on the Development and 
Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (Brussels: The 
Commission, 2002), online: <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/rpt/2002/com2002_0545en01.pde>.
108 See e.g. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lemer, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System 
is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to do About It (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004); Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? (United Kingdom: Earthscan Publication, 2002); Amani, Merchants and Missionaries, 
supra note 15,
109 Alison Brysk, “Human Rights and Private Wrongs: Constructing Norms in Global Civil Society” 
online: < http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/groups/ccsa/Brysk.pdf> at 6.
And while public health in Canada has garnered much debate in relation to the 
system of public health delivery, the issue has been primarily increased funding and 
the prevention of private services rather than reducing the impediments to cost- 
effective care by re-examining policies in other sectors, such as patents. In the 
absence of express constitutional protection under the Charter, the protection of the 
right to health care remains fragile in Canada. There is apparently very little citizens 
can do to ensure their human right is not a hollow right when faced with harm 
resulting from a competing “policy” decision, such as the granting of gene patents, 
by government agencies.
A) The Poison is the Elixir: How Chaoulli nurtures a “new” right
The drafters of the Charter specifically excluded the right to property and freedom of 
contract from the enumerated constitutionally protected rights.110 S. 7 of the Charter 
sets out that “[ejveryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.” The substitution of “security of the person” for “property” in 
this section has, however, given rise to “new property” claims for welfare and other 
social benefits under the Charter inextricably tied to the welfare state’s conception 
of the value of human life, liberty, security of the person, and integral to the concept 
of human dignity. The SCC left open the possibility of recognizing these “new” 
rights as subsumed within s. 7 constitutional rights in Irwin Toy. 11
When faced with specific claims for benefits against the state, however, the 
Court has consistently rejected the recognition of “new property” claims imposing 
any positive obligation on the state for their delivery.112 This reflects a general 
reluctance found in public sector liability negligence jurisprudence to impose 
liability in tort for policy based decisions of public authorities because of the 
financial, economic, political, and social factors involved -  all considerations better 
suited for deliberation by our elected representatives.113 In Gosselin v. Quebec,114
110 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 1003 [Irwin Toy].
111 Irwin Toy, ibid. Dickson, C.J.C. speaking for the majority at para. 96, found:
the rubric of ‘economic rights’ embraces a broad spectrum of interests, ranging 
from such rights, included in various international covenants, as rights to social 
security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food, clothing and shelter, to 
traditional property -  contract rights. To exclude all of these at this early moment 
in the history of Charter interpretation seems to us to be precipitous.
112 In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Masse v. Ontario (Ministry o f Community and Social 
Services (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.) trial decision where a challenge to the more than 
20% cut in provincial social assistance rates was rejected as the Court found that the Charter did not 
guarantee a minimal level of public welfare assistance; Fernandes v. Manitoba (Director of Social 
Services (Winnipeg Central)) (1992), 78 Man. R. (2d) 172, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 402 (C.A.) where it was 
held that the refusal by municipal welfare officials to cover the cost of part-time home care was not 
unconstitutional as, according to the Manitoba Court of Appeal at para. 13, “The personal choices of a 
particular individual are not generally to be considered when those choices affect the public purse.”
113 A public body would not be liable for the tort of negligence where reasonable care was not exercised 
in the making of that policy. For a discussion of this distinction, see Just, supra note 46; Brown v.
the argument in favour of a constitutional right to welfare proceeded from the 
Quebec courts to the SCC for determination on whether the government’s reduction 
of welfare benefits to one third the base amount of that payable to those under the 
age of thirty who were not participating in training or work experience employment 
programs breached the recipient’s s. 7 (and s. 15 equality) rights and was therefore a 
nullity. McLachlin C.J.C. found that nothing in the language or jurisprudence of s. 7 
suggested a positive obligation on the state to guarantee adequate living standards 
and therefore the reduction of welfare rates did not violate the principles of 
fundamental justice.115 This decision has been criticized by parties at both ends of 
the political spectrum. Conservatives argue that the major impact of Gosselin was to 
give judicial weight to principles not found in our domestic law. According to Neil 
Seeman, a lawyer and director of the CANSTATS project at the Fraser Institute of 
Toronto:
Few in Canada are in favour of a legal right to a minimum annual income.
A right to freeload? No way. Most Canadians reject the idea; and so, too, 
does a robust body of constitutional jurisprudence and legislation. 
...Whatever the result, the real legacy of this case will be that litigants 
may turn to documentary evidence from international human rights 
instruments, nowhere legislated in domestic law, to push for ever greater 
economic benefits and state resources. Why work when you can sue?116
Poverty law advocates Martha Jackman and Lome Sossin, on the other hand, 
have long advocated for the Charter’s progressive advancement of positive rights. 
Jackman writes:
Governments in all parts of the country have been elected and have thrived 
on poor- and welfare-bashing platforms. Poverty has been characterized 
by our political leaders not as a serious and systemic economic problem, 
but an individualized phenomenon blamed on the poor themselves, who 
are depicted as fraudulent, lazy and responsible for their own misfortune.
In this political context Charter litigation has been taken up...not as a 
means of bypassing democratically elected governments, or undermining 
parliamentary democracy, but rather as a mechanism for calling the
British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways) [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420; Cooper v. Hobart 
(2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 287 (B.C.C.A.), afPd [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537. See also Dunmore v. Ontario 
(Attorney General) (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 50 (Ont. Gen. Div.) wherein the trial judge 
posited that “[t]here are many forms of injustice in our society, particularly those resulting from 
uneven distribution of wealth, that cannot be remedied by the courts through interpretation of the 
Charter and that must be remedied through the legislative process.” [footnotes omitted]. A view also 
shared by the trial court in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1992] R.J.Q. 1647 (C.S. Que.) trial 
decision. These and other decisions affecting social welfare are discussed in greater detail by Jackman 
“Charter Equality”, supra note 1.
114 Gosselin (SCC), supra note 77.
115 Ibid. at paras. 81-84.
116 Neil Seeman, “The UN’s Right to Welfare” Fraser Forum (October 2002) 11 at 11. online: 
<http://www.fraserinstitute.ca>.
legislative and executive branches to account for their failure to respect 
the basic rights and interests of a group.. .117
Professors Jackman and Sossin criticize the SCC’s finding in Gosselin for intimating 
a false dichotomy between policy and operational measures and between positive 
and negative rights informing the evolution of Charter principles. Jackman asserts:
The major difficulty facing low income litigants invoking the Charter in 
the social welfare context originates, I would argue, is a series of 
presumptions that are regularly applied by courts at all levels in welfare 
cases. These include the presumption that parliamentary sovereignty 
remains unfettered in the social policy context; that the state is neutral in 
its dealing with the poor; that social welfare policies and programs are 
benign in their intent and their effects in relation to low income people; 
and that welfare recipients themselves are primarily to blame for any 
disadvantage that they suffer. The presumption that social policy is 
beyond the legitimate purview of the courts is pervasive in the Charter 
cases.118
Sossin sums up the decision as one which found that the provision of the basic 
necessities for survival was a matter of governmental policy preference and not a 
matter of constitutional law even though this is incongruent with (a) Canada’s 
commitment to the ICESCR and (b) the reality that participation in the rights that are 
constitutionally protected require a certain level of physical and mental integrity and 
security in place which can only be satisfied by the provision of basic housing and 
food. These basic necessities, in conjunction with access to health services, in turn 
affect one’s health and together these rights affect one’s ability to participate further 
in our social and judicial system.119 All in all, both Jackman and Sossin view 
Gosselin as a blow against human rights protection.120
The SCC again visited the Charter’s potential to accomodate ESCRs in Auton 
v. British Columbia. 121 In Auton, the British Columbia government refused to 
provide public funding (based on financial constraints) for services designed for 
autistic children which fell outside of the funded “core services” set out in provincial 
health service legislation. This policy was challenged under s. 15 (equality rights) of
117 Jackman, “Charter Equality”, supra note 1 at 73.
118 Ibid. at 75.
119 Lome Sossin, “Towards a Two-Tier Constitution? The Poverty of Health Rights” in Flood, Sossin & 
Roach supra note 23 at 171 [Sossin, “Two-Tier Constitution”]. See also Lynn A. Iding, “In a Poor 
State: The Long Road to Human Rights Protection on the Basis of Social Condition” (2003) 41 Alta. 
L. Rev. 513.
120 Jackman, “Last Line of Defence”, supra note 22 and Sossin, “Two-Tier Constitution”, ibid. Sossin 
argues that “the better view is that the positive/negative rights distinction itself is pernicious. It 
assumes a world of rights-bearing autonomous individuals which is foreign to most low-income 
people.” at 171.
121 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, rev’g 
(2002) 220 D.L.R. (4th) 411 (B.C.C.A).
the Charter. The B.C. Court of Appeal ordered the government to provide these 
services to all autistic children finding that the policy violated Charter rights even 
though the legislation itself was constitutional. The SCC reversed that finding. 
Ultimately the claim in Auton failed because these services were not being delivered 
by hospitals or doctors, nor were they recommended by doctors but by therapists 
who were not designated as “health care practitioners”. Moreover, the court was not 
satisfied that these services were medically necessary in light of possible alternative 
treatments; an important point since the Canada Health Act only reimburses 
provinces for medically necessary services.
Until recently then, it was clear that health was not a constitutionally protected 
right and that policy decisions could not attract “public authority liability” in tort. 
Auton signals the highpoint of judicial reluctance to protect a positive right to health 
under the Charter. Against this unfavourable judicial backdrop to ESCRs, it was 
widely anticipated that the SCC would not interfere with the legislative decision 
under Quebec’s health and hospital insurance plans to prohibit private health services 
for services offered in the public system -  despite the serious delays within that 
system negatively affecting individual health outcomes. Ironically, proponents for a 
constitutionalized health right, such as the CCPI/CHC who had intervener status in 
Chaoulli, opposed the striking down of the legislation on the basis of equity:
[C]ontrary to the Appellants and their supporting interveners, and 
consistent with Canada’s international commitments in relation to health 
and human rights.. .section 7 guarantees access to care without barriers on 
ability to pay... To the extent that the ...state’s single-payer monopoly 
was necessary to safeguard that right, [the contested legislation] 
represented a positive measure required by the Charter’s guarantees of 
equality and security of the person.122
The majority and dissent agreed on little except that delays in access to medical 
care in the public system impaired security of the person and, in extreme situations, 
endangered life. The majority’s decision is criticized by the dissent and opponents 
for coming to three conclusions allegedly not supported by the evidence: that waiting 
lists in Canada are excessive, that the ability to purchase private insurance will mean
122 Jackman, “Last Line of Defence”, supra note 22 at 3 [emphasis added]. With the greatest respect for 
Professor Jackman who acted as counsel for the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI) and the 
Canadian Health Coalition (CHC) and by her own account has made a “scholarly career of claiming 
that Canadian Charter-based review of government decision-making in relation to health care and 
other social and economic rights is a legitimate and valuable accountability mechanism, that can also 
promote the fundamental Charter goal o f substantive e q u a l i t y I fail to see how insisting that 
everyone be treated alike is a good thing if they are all treated equally poor. The majority’s decision is 
a better one for promoting progressive health protection in recognizing a right to have one’s health not 
interfered with unlawfully by the state. It may well be that the short term impact of Chaoulli is 
inequality in so far as those who can afford treatment or medical services by parallel means will get it 
through private insurers and those without money are left in the public system with the state as their 
insurer. But this may, as some of the evidence suggested, in fact improve the public health care 
system by the exit of some users and in addition promotes substantive equality in that everyone enjoys 
equal treatment to have their health free from unjustified interference by other regulatory schemes.
that Canadians will not experience wait times for treatment, and that private 
insurance will not undermine the quality of publicly funded medicare.123 However, 
the conclusion was based on the fact that the majority differed in its characterization 
of the issue and over whether deference was owed to the Quebec legislature and 
lower courts. McLachlin CJ.C. and Major J. wrote:
The appellants do not seek an order that the government spend more 
money on health care, nor do they seek an order that waiting times for 
treatment under the public health care scheme be reduced. They only seek a ruling that because delays in the public system place their health and 
security at risk, they should be allowed to take out insurance to permit 
them to access private services.124
The existence of unmanageable waiting lists and the material contribution this 
made to increasing the risk of harm to individuals led the majority to find in favour 
of the appellants that a Charter violation had occurred. By doing so, the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to health as subsumed within the s. 7 negative 
rights. At first, we might narrowly conclude that the SCC is simply more eager to 
see a violation of s. 7 if a government plan prevents someone from obtaining a 
service in the private sector as in Chaoulli, rather than when government does not 
publicly cover a service, as in Auton.125 These divergent claims, however, recognize 
that the right to health is, at a minimum, a “negative” right. For the reasons outlined, 
Chaoulli is about more than simply the private/public debate regarding provision of 
services and accountability for their neglect. The dichotomy of rights offered -  
though subject to significant criticism -  is a positive step toward constitutionalizing 
the progressive realization of health rights as permitted by the ICESCR; and 
effectively protects health from positive intrusion through other state created 
regulatory regimes.
Roy Ramonov, head of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in 
Canada, disagrees. He was critical of the judiciary’s finding. Commenting on the 
sanctity of medicare for Canadians and its importance as an integral part of the fabric 
of our society, our identity and our culture, he writes:
In my view, there is no better window on the future of our nation than the 
manner [sic] which we collectively deal with medicare. How we handle 
the issues arising from the recurrent debates on the provision of health 
provides us with a glimpse of our future together -  or not! ... Will a 
particular ideology prevail, despite the preponderance of evidence that its 
tenets are contrary to Canadians’ core values? Will this decision end the 
great social experiment known around the world as Canada? 126
123 For a discussion of these, see Flood & Sullivan, supra note 19 at 142.
124 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 103 [emphasis added],
125 Thanks to Trudo Lemmens, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, for this comment.
126 Roy Romanow, “Access to care, access to justice: The legal debate over private health insurance in 
Canada” U of T Bulletin (26 September 2005), online: <http://www.news.utoronto.ca
In fact, Chaoulli is a case criticized by many for a number of reasons, including 
the Court’s ability to deal with expert technical evidence.127 But, more vocally, it is 
an instance of judicial activism that has led, as Lorraine Weinrib notes, to social 
outrage -  only this time from the political left instead of the political right. The split 
decision reveals “deep divisions on basic questions of Charter analysis, fact, and 
remedy.”128 Critics echo the dissent’s concern that the health right recognized is 
impoverished, and fear that once the prohibition is removed in one province, other 
provinces will follow. Overall, this chain reaction will have a dire impact on 
Canada’s most important social program -  public health. But, the negative right to 
health recognized in Chaoulli corresponds with governments’ duty of care and helps 
to explain how health can be rationally subsumed within s.7 Charter rights. A 
“negative right to health” imposes on the government an obligation to not directly 
harm or materially contribute to the risk of harm to the health of its citizens with 
regulatory measures adopted contrary to the realization of s. 7 rights. The 
anticipated impact on the quality of the right to health (as measured in terms of equal 
access for the rich and poor to health services) is the basis of opposition to Chaoulli 
by the political left since the poor may not be able to afford or qualify for insurance. 
Yet this other dimension to the decision shows how the precedent may come to 
protect (public) health from external threats of policy preferences that prioritize other 
regulatory schemes, administrative decisions, and proprietary interests; here the rich 
and the poor are equal beneficiaries.129
Chaoulli endorses the ability to seek privately insured services and so there 
may be merit in the perceived threats to the public health system. However, the 
decision may alternatively be seen as the first to mark the nascent origins of a 
constitutional right to health that will render poor policy, negligent operational 
measures, and administrative decisions subject to quasi-tortious constitutional 
liability as wrongs affecting Charter rights.130 In short, Chaoulli has not simply led 
to a “two-tiered” health care system, a “two-tiered constitution” 131 , the
/bin6/thoughts/050926-1665.asp> [emphasis added]. He adds, “Whatever may be the eventual 
answers to these questions, we are at yet another serious crossroads in both health care and its 
contribution to nation building, Canadian identity and, not least, health outcomes.”
127 See e.g. Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile & Sasha Kontic, “Finding Health Policy ‘Arbitrary’: The 
Evidence on Waiting, Dying, and Two-Tier Systems” in Flood, Sossin & Roach, supra note 23 at 296.
128 Lorraine E. Weinrib, “SCC’s analysis fell short in its Chaoulli ruling” Law Times (14 November 2005) 
at 6,15.
129 Equal beneficiaries as subjects of the law that is and not in absolute terms since social stratifications, 
as Jackman and Sossin have noted, restrict equal access to the courts and the enforcement of the law.
130 “Quasi-tortious” in the sense that there is a duty of care found and a foreseeability of harm but liability 
does not require fault and may not necessarily lead the same degree of damages. See Peter H. Russell, 
“Chaoulli: The Political versus the Legal Life of a Judicial Decision” in Flood, Sossin & Roach, supra 
note 23 at 6; and Bernard M. Dickens, “The Chaoulli Decision: Less than Meets the Eye -  or More?” 
in Flood, Sossin & Roach, supra note 23 at 19 for the opinion that the decision is too narrow to stand 
for much of what it is perceived to establish and therefore is actually “less than meets the eye”.
131 Sossin, “Two-Tier Constitution”, supra note 119.
“impoverishment of health rights” 132 or the affirmation of “an empty right”. 133 
Instead, the decision should be applauded for recognizing the indivisibility of human 
rights and that the civil rights and liberties contained in s. 7 guarantee a right to 
health consistent with Canada’s international obligations and provide a mechanism 
for accountability for the state’s harmful wrongs.134 From this perspective, we may 
re-imagine that Chaoulli gives rise to possibilities that are in fact health promoting 
and that transcend traditional limitations of definitional dichotomies of “policy” 
versus “operational” decisions where the decision adversely imposes on the 
individual’s constitutionally protected rights. As Peter Russell suggests, Chaoulli 
may be the kind of decision that can live a double-life, such that “[w]hat the decision 
comes to mean in the political life of the countiy may differ -  indeed may differ 
wildly -  from what the judges actually decided.”13
Having established that the Charter applies and that there has been a violation 
of a Charter right, the burden shifts to the government to establish that the limit on 
the s. 7 guarentee of rights is justifiable under the law which we do next while 
working through a complaint.
P a r t  3: U sin g  Sec t io n  7 R ig h t s  t o  P r o te c t  A g a in st  Pa t e n t  
W ro n g s
Working through a Charter challenge helps conceptualize a challenge to the 
constitutionality of gene patents. I am a litigant BRCA1 carrier who, due to delay in 
testing by a state-created single source monopoly provider (as in Chaoulli), was 
unable to have my genetic hereditary screening done in time to have an elective 
mastectomy or take other preventative measures to avoid spread. As a result, my 
cancer has metasticized, I have suffered mental and physical harm, and death may be 
imminent. Where the issues are of public interest, the test from Minister of Justice of 
Canada v. Borowski applies; the issue must be serious, the claimants must be directly 
affected or have a genuine interest as citizens, and there must be no other effective 
means available to them.136 I need not be a BRCA 1 or 2 gene carrier but can simply 
be an interested member of the public (i.e agents for a provincial or national cancer 
agency). I must be unable under the CPA to raise the issue of the legality of gene 
patent policy or the faulty operational measures extending patent law to dissonantly 
allow for the grant of gene patents. Genetic information and DNA sequences are,
132 Jackman, “Last Line of Defence” supra note 22.
133 See Flood & Sullivan, supra note 19 at 142-43.
134 Stanley H. Hartt, “Arbitrariness, Randomness, and the Principles of Fundamental Justice” in Flood, 
Sossin & Roach, supra note 23 at 505. Hartt writes, “Many see the landmark judgment as a courageous 
and brilliant blow struck by the judiciary, using the Charter as a sword, not a shield, for the right of 
human beings to insist that the State no longer be free to deprive them of life, or to cause them pain, 
suffering and deterioration of their health, by rationing scarce fiscal resources.. .”
135 Russell, supra note 130 at 5.
136 [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575. See also Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 35.
arguably, not patentable if the standards and statutory requirements for patentability 
are properly applied.137 As a result, the only means of challenge under patent law is 
to seek revocation of the patent on a case by case basis through expensive invalidity 
litigation.138 But are my health rights justiciable in light of the inconsistent historical 
treatment of health in Auton and Chaoulli?
In Chaoulli, McLachlin C.J.C. confirmed that, while health care is still not a 
free standing positive constitutional right “where the government puts in place a 
scheme to provide health care, that scheme must comply with the Charter. 9 This 
suggests an acceptance of a duty of care within s. 7 Charter language whereby a 
constitutional wrong may be found where the regulatory scheme breaches the 
Charter standards of care.
If we accept the broad interpretation of Chaoulli and agree that a negative right 
to health is subsumed within the language of s. 7, then we are acknowledging that the 
government owes a duty of care to individuals to ensure that s. 7 rights are not 
infringed by the patent regulatory scheme. This is easier than establishing a common 
law duty of care for negligence and, given that the SCC has said that “the mere fact 
that [a] question may have policy ramifications does not permit us to avoid 
answering it”, constitutional litigation may be the preferred route to redress.
In establishing a public law (constitutional) duty of care, McLachlin C.J.C. 
finds that “[t]he jurisprudence of this Court holds that delays in obtaining medical 
treatment which affect patients physically and psychologically trigger the protection 
of s.7 of the Charter.”140 Once a constitutional duty exists, the next question is the
137 See Nuffield Council, “The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper” (20 July 2002), online- 
<http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/patentingdna/publication_310.htinl>. The paper argues 
that “patents involving DNA sequences should be the exception rather than the rule. It makes 
recommendations for future policy in the area, including a number of significant changes to the way 
that patents are granted involving DNA sequences.” See generally, Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lemer, 
Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and 
Progress, and What to Do About It (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004). See also 
Congressman Xavier Becerra’s opening remarks to his proposed Bill to ban gene patents, supra note 
60.
138 The costs as noted may be prohibitively high. See Lemley, “Rational Ignorance” supra note 57 at 
1501-02. Several studies look at the paucity of institutional resources that result in the growing 
number of “bad patents” -  these are patents of poor and questionable quality. See U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission, “To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and 
Policy”, (2003) online: <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.htm>. See also William Blumenthal, 
“Aligning Competition Policy and Patent Policy: A Perspective From the Federal Trade Commission 
Staff’, (30 June 2006) online: <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/20060630FCBA BackgroundPaper.pdf>. 
Some authors recommend patent reform to allow for re-examination of the patent to challenge validity, 
see J.H. Barton, “Intellectual Property Rights: Reforming the Patent System” Science 287 (17 March 
2000) 1933. For a discussion of the literature, see Bita Amani, “The Promise and Perfidy of Patents: 
Biotechnology, the Genetic Revolution, and the Invention of “invention”” forthcoming in Ikechi 
Mgbeoji, ed., Intellectual Property and Biotechnology in the Age of Globalization: Challenges, 
Opportunities and Risk (British Columbia: UBC Press).
139 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 104.
140 Ibid. at para. 118.
basis for imposing liability for s. 24(1) damages or through other relief such as: an 
injunction on all existing gene patent rights and related licencing, a declaration of 
their invalidity as a species, or a moratorium on further grants by the CPO to allow 
for democratic debate and a parliamentary response.
Ken Cooper-Stevenson, in his seminal work Charter Damage Claims, 141 
advocates that constitutional claims should be informed by the substantive principles 
of tort law.142 While this has often been interpreted as requiring some degree of fault 
(whether negligence or intent), tort law does not require it. Historically, torts against 
the person captured in the Writs of Trespass were actionable per se and required the 
plaintiff to merely establish their occurrence at which point the onus would shift to 
the defendant to establish a legal defence or the absence of fault (intention or 
negligence).143 I suggest that the protection of rights in s. 7 safeguard the same 
interest that tort law did against wrongs in the old Writs of Trespass and requires no 
degree of fault to be established for liability per se. Articulating the same principle, 
Lome Sossin states that Charter violations should be determined on a no-fault (strict 
liability) basis for the duties the state owes to protect against wrongs against the 
rights recognized.144 While a mere breach of a Charter right is enough to find prima 
facie liability strictly under the Charter, the presence of fault (whether intention or 
negligence) further entrenches the justness of such an outcome and is best 
determined when interpreting s. 7’s internal limitation of rights through “the 
principles of fundamental justice”. According to Lamer J., the principles of 
fundamental justice “are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system.” 145 
Given the normative reliance on moral blameworthiness within the statutory and 
common law of our legal system in a range of fields -  from private law subjects of 
contracts and torts to public law subjects including criminal law -  we can conclude 
that one of the principles of fundamental justice in our society is accountability for 
fault.
Chaoulli encourages us to re-examine normative, substantive and procedural 
questions related to public sector liability for individual human health. Recognizing 
a positive right to health as part of the protected rights in s. 7 is fraught with
141 Ken Cooper-Stevenson, Charter Damages Claims (Toronto: Carswell, 1990). Cooper-Stevenson 
suggests this was the approach taken in Just, supra note 46, and other cases determining a public 
authority private tort duty of care.
142 Ibid. at 18, 55, 83-90. See also Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora, 
Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994).
143 For law professor Kent Roach, negligence has an important role to play under the Charter with the 
familiar standard of objective reasonableness that finds support in the language of s. 1 imposing 
justified limits to Charter rights. Professor Lome Sossin, on the other hand, rejects the 
policy/operation distinction quintessential to public sector liability in tort as infusing a Charter 
analysis See Lome Sossin, “Crown Prosecutors and Constitutional Torts: The Promise and Politics of 
Charter Damages” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 372.
144 Ibid. at 404.
145 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
definitional and operational difficulties, though not insurmountable, that human 
rights scholars and their critics often associate with social and economic rights more 
generally: what is the content and substance of a right to health (or welfare) and what 
obligations does that confer on the state for their provision? It also raises propriety 
issues of jurisdiction, judicial activism and restraint in determining economic 
resource allocation: how much health is the state obliged to provide and at what costs 
given that public resources are limited? Such questions are amenable to the 
description of “pure” policy issues within the purview of the legislature. However, if 
there is a constitutionally protected negative right to health, as Chaoulli articulates, 
then governments may be liable for express or even surreptitious intrusions on this 
right through legislation or other (administrative) state measures. Instead of 
requiring active state intervention, Chaoulli implicitly posits that the constitutional 
right to health only requires state forbearance. Governments may be complicit in 
failing to regulate non-interference with health or, worse, in positively sanctioning 
interference by legally elevating the rights of third party patentees over cancer 
patients. In so doing, health, an otherwise public good, is privatized and health 
policy is made subject to regulatory preferences for trade and industrial policy. The 
Chaoulli negative right to health is consistent with the existing negative Charter 
freedoms (such as life, liberty and security of the person); overcomes jurisdictional 
and definitional limitations; and is one progressive step closer to the full realization 
of health rights.
Whether the preference given to industrial policy demands deference is “based 
on two guiding principles of justification: the measure must be consistent with 
democratic values and it must be necessary in order to maintain public order and the 
general well-being of citizens.”146 Situations demanding deference are those:
in which government is required to mediate competing interests and to 
choose between a number of legislative priorities... In short, a court must 
show deference where the evidence establishes that the government has 
assigned proper weight to each of the competing interests.147
The granting of gene patents has garnered much debate and public skepticism 
regarding the operation of the CPO and the interpretation of patent legislation. 
Failure to address this issue in recent amendments to the Patent A ct148 is an 
abdication of governmental responsibility and ignores the recommendations made 
for a legislative response by the Canadian Biotech Advisory Committee and the 
SCC.149 The policy to grant such patents was ad hoc and bottom-up; derived from
146 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 93.
147 Ibid. at para. 94.
148 Patent Act, supra note 14.
149 See the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa, Canada Bill C-9, An Act to amend the Patent Act and the 
Food and Drugs Act, 3d Sess., 37th Pari., 2004, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/37/3 
/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-9_2.PDF>. In Harvard College v. Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 [Harvard, (SCC)], the Court accepted the Canadian 
Advisory Committee’s final recommendation that the legislature act on this issue rather than the
Patent Office Practice rather than any real consideration or “weighing” of the 
competing interests involved. Clearly, no deference is owed to this measure. 
Deschamps J. found that:
while the government has the power to decide what measures to adopt, it 
cannot choose to do nothing in the face of the violation of... [the] right to 
security. The government has not given reasons for its failure to act.
Inertia cannot be used as an argument to justify deference.150
In addition, it is not clear whether there is a significant difference between state 
granted monopoly (to the state) in health coupled with wait lists and state granted 
monopoly (to a private proprietor) in patents coupled with wait lists and/or other 
analogous harmful conditions like exorbitant royalties and licencing fees.151 Both 
are state created and materially increase the risk of harm for individual health. 
Patents contribute to delays and wait times in testing by giving the patent holder full 
control over the use and access to the invention. The BRCA1 and 2 patents, for 
example, created “scarcity” by imposing an artificial monopoly for the patentee -  
Myriad -  whose exclusive rights empowered it to demand that all testing proceed 
through them or a licenced lab. This raised complicated issues of sovereignty. 
France complained, legitimately arguing that the requirement basically forces genetic 
samples to be sent out of country to Myriad labs in the United States over which 
there was no French regulatory oversight or control. In addition, researchers 
complained that they could not test or develop alternative improved methods for 
testing, undermining one of the main rationales for granting patents in the first place 
and making it difficult to scientifically validate the test. The B.C. Cancer Agency 
performed some 600 tests but Myriad’s cease and desist letters effectively forced the 
B.C. government to discontinue its testing, favouring the rights of the patentee over 
individual rights to health. In response, over the next 2 years, the B.C. Cancer 
Agency referred 150 female cancer patients to Ontario’s research study and were 
transferred there for testing free of charge (although Ontario’s study was allegedly in 
continued patent violation). Approximately 30 additional women elected to have 
the testing done by Myriad Genetic Laboratories directly.152 It may be argued that it 
is not the grant of a patent that is unconstitutional by violating s. 7 rights, but how
courts. Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Related 
Issues: Report to the Government of Canada Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee, 
(June 2002) online: <http://cbac-cccb.ca/epic/intemet/incbac-cccb.nsf7en/ah00188e.html>.
150 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 97.
151 Although B.C. resumed testing of cancer patients for the BRCA1 and 2 genes in 2003, the B.C. Cancer 
Agency reports that there is now a one year waiting list for counseling with 300 families waiting for 
testing. “Genetic Testing Resumes at B.C. Cancer Agency”, (14 February 2003), online: 
<http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/ABCCA/NewsCentre/NewsArchive/2003/GeneticTestingResumesAtBCC 
ancerAgency.htm>. See Institut Curie, Press Release, “Another Victory for Opponents of Patents Held 
by Myriad Genetics: European Patent Office Rejects the Essential Points of BRCA1 Gene Patents” 
(31 January 2005) online: <http://www.curie.fr /upload/presse/myriadpatents310105.pdf>. In 
November 2004, Myriad Diagnostics sold its BRCA patents to the University of Utah Research 
Foundation but continues to hold exclusive licences.
152 Ibid.
that patent is exercised which is a private matter not attracting Charter application. 
However, how a patent holder exercises his monopoly is only secondary to the 
question of whether that monopoly right was wrongly conferred by a public authority 
acting outside of the statutory authority given, which is the basis of this 
constitutional challenge; successfully contesting gene patent harms will be easier 
within a constitutional “tort” framework than in the private law of torts.
Familiar principles of duty of care from tort law can reconcile divergent 
treatments of the right to health under the Charter. The majority in Chaoulli does 
not undertake a tort analysis for establishing a duty of care pursuant to the test 
articulated by the same court in Cooper. Nevertheless, implicit in the majority’s 
finding of a public law duty of care within s. 7 rights are identifiable analogies to tort 
law where a private duty was found to be owed by a person who has undertaken a 
rescue, assumed care and control or has otherwise undertaken a duty of care 
(indicating a special relationship and proximity) as our government has to deliver 
health services publicly. In recognizing a s. 7 duty of care, the majority found that 
the government, having chosen to act, cannot do so negligently if the act adversely 
affects the life, liberty and security of the person — to do so is unconstitutional. 
Failure to provide timely health services in a public monopoly by managing waiting 
lists appropriately is exactly such a misfeasance; even if the “wrong”, as in this case, 
is characterized by the majority as a “right” under s. 7. The law of tort is the law of 
involuntary obligations where “[r]ights and duties are the quintessential elements of 
the law...”153 An offence against the public, such as long waiting times, is a public 
wrong but once consequences ensue for the individual, it becomes a private wrong 
actionable publicly. “All are wrongs,” according to Fridman “in the sense that they 
involve behaviour that is not justified by the law, though they can occur without 
fault, i.e. either the intent to do wrong or negligence, on the part of the alleged 
wrongdoer.”154
For the dissent in Chaoulli, the delays in the public system are a necessary and 
acceptable function of rationing high-quality care at a reasonable cost for as many 
people as possible. Gaining access to private insurance would undermine the interest 
of die less wealthy and uninsurable. Furthermore, the dissent was very concerned 
with how substantive content would be given to this new right: how long is 
constitutionally too long to be wait-listed for a medical service?
What, then, are constitutionally required “reasonable health services”?
What is treatment “within a reasonable time”? What are the benchmarks?
How short a waiting list is short enough? How many MRIs does the 
Constitution require? The majority does not tell us. The majority lays 
down no manageable constitutional standard. The public cannot know, 
nor can judges or governments know, how much health care is
153 G.H.L Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 10.
154 Ibid. at 14.
“reasonable” enough to satisfy s. 7 of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms..”155
Binnie and LeBel JJ.’s dissent criticizes the majority’s decision for their failure 
to provide direction for future adjudication on waiting periods and for assuming an 
adjudicative role for a policy matter outside of the Courts’ jurisdiction. However, 
their criticism just as easily applies to judges in a court of law dealing with such 
nebulous concepts as the “reasonable person”, “reasonably foreseeable risk”, the 
“person of ordinary skill in the art” or difficult to determine elements of “causation”. 
The divergent perspectives of the majority and dissent stem from two fundamentally 
different questions that each strives to answer -  reconcilable through the familiar 
lens of tort law and in particular, negligence principles. While the dissent is 
influenced by the traditional doctrine which posits no duty of care owed for policy 
decisions, the majority examines whether the government owes a duty of care arising 
from s. 7 rights to protect the individual’s health from unjustifiable intrusion whether 
or not the contested measure is a policy decision. The majority finds that “where a 
law adversely affects life, liberty or security of the person, it must conform to the 
principles of fundamental justice.” Whether the intrusion meets the principles of 
“fundamental justice” is a matter raising the standard of care owed and, as with 
regular tort law, the standard of care is a question of law to be determined by the 
judge.
As in Chaoulli, the principle of fundamental justice here would be that laws 
that affect life, liberty and security of the person shall not be arbitrary. By analogy, 
the current state of the law in relation to gene patents and patenting life generally do 
appear to be arbitrary as the law in this area “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent 
with, the objective that lies behind [it].”156 This, in turn, requires “consideration of 
the state interest and societal concerns that the provision is meant to reflect.” 
Moreover, “[i]n order not to be arbitrary, the limit on life, liberty and security 
requires not only a theoretical connection between the limit and the legislative goal, 
but a real connection on the facts”158 the onus of which rests on the claimant. The 
court also finds precedents for the proposition that limits that are unnecessary to 
assure that those objectives are met may also be arbitrary.159
To determine the issue of arbitrariness, we must first determine the objective 
that underlies patent legislation and then proceed to assess whether the interference 
with the s. 7 rights of the person is impermissibly arbitrary in that it lacks a real 
connection to the purpose the interference is said to serve.
155 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 163.
156 Ibid. at para. 130, the hallmarks of “arbitrary” are set out.
157 Ibid. at paras. 130-31.
158 Ibid. at paras. 130-33.
159 See discussion of R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 in Chaoulli, ibid. at para. 118-22.
The speed of biotechnological innovation has demanded that patent law quickly 
adapt but the adaptation has been ad hoc. By implication, the necessary public 
discourse for a thoughtful long term response to the challenges posed by, and to, 
biotech research and the incremental expansion of property rights to life has been 
compromised if not overlooked. The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal (FCA)160 
has identified two main reasons for granting a patent. First, patents are necessary to 
encourage innovation. 161 As economists point out, ideas, knowledge and 
information are not naturally scarce -  that is, they can be shared infinitely without 
being diminished or depriving the original right holder.162 Because knowledge is 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable,163 property rights are required to protect against 
market failure and the free rider problem:
Without patent protection, as soon as a product implementing a new idea 
is marketed, others could copy it and compete with the original inventor 
without having to have made the initial research and development 
investment. Competitors who did not have to cover such costs could drive 
prices down to such a level that the original inventor could not recoup the 
research and development investments made, let alone a return on that 
investment, thereby discouraging the creation of inventions.164
In the absence of patent rights granting exclusivity, a company, having invested 
significantly in innovation, would be disadvantaged by the free rider who comes 
along after the costs have already been borne to reap the commercial benefits of that 
which he has not sown.165 The result would be a net welfare loss due to the 
disincentives to innovate. But, as Wendy Gordon aptly qualifies:
[t]he issue of limits is vital... The law of intellectual property must be 
narrower than an entitlement to ‘receive payment for all the benefits you 
generate’. After all, if we tried to give incentives to authors and inventors 
by eliminating all free riding, society would grind to a stop. Education, 
progress and community all depend on our sometimes being able to ‘reap
160 President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada (Comissioner o f Patents), [20001 4 F.C. 528 
[Harvard (FCA)].
161 Ibid. at para. 105. The majority of the court found that the purpose of a patent is “to permit the 
recovery of research and development investment necessary to produce the invention and a return on 
that investment to the inventor, commensurate with the value purchasers place on the invention.”
162 W.R. Cornish, Dr. M Llewelyn & Dr. M. Adcock, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Genetics: A 
Study into the Impact and Management of Intellectual Property Rights within the Healthcare Sector, 
(Cambridge: Public Health Genetic Unit, July 2003).
163 IP is different from tangible property in that knowledge is non-rivalrous which means that it does not 
lose its utility as it is used and reused but remains intact and therefore can be imitated and transmitted 
at close to zero costs. Knowledge is also non-excludable which means that it can be consumed or 
possessed by more than one individual without depriving the right holder of any use. There are 
widespread public benefits from the sharing of knowledge but the costs are borne privately and so, the 
argument made is, government regulation is needed in this area due to market failure.
164 Harvard (FCA), supra note 160 at para. 25.
165 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 27.
without sowing’, just as being members of a community requires us to 
tolerate some uncompensated mistakes and harms.166
In addition, the conceptual basis on which innovation is privatized under patent 
legislation perverts the nature of scientific discovery, particularly as it evolved in the 
field of genomics. In a seminal work by Thomas S. Kuhn, “The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions,” 167 the author provides insight on what drives science; 
historically it has not been letters patent:
To scientists, at least, the results gained in normal research are significant 
because they add to the scope and precision with which the paradigm can
be applied.168 That answer, however, cannot account for the enthusiasm 
and devotion that scientists display for the problems of normal research...
Bringing a normal research problem to a conclusion is achieving the 
anticipated in a new way, and it requires the solution of all sorts of 
complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles. The man 
who succeeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver, and the challenge of 
the puzzle is an important part of what usually drives him on.169
It was this truth-seeking, puzzle-solving, drive that led to the discovery of the 
double helix structure of DNA by James Watson and Francis Crick in 1953; DNA is 
“the fundamental hereditary material of all living organisms,” 170 comprised of amino 
acids arranged in sequences that code for genes, the basic functional and physical 
units of heredity that contain coded information necessary for understanding the 
functions of proteins (the study of proteomics). Genes affect everything from human 
intelligence and physical appearance to the propensity to develop specific diseases, 
differentially metabolize drugs, or respond to environmental or social changes such 
as diet and exercise. Genetic mapping was largely the result of an international 
public collaborative consortioum known as the Human Genome Project (HGP) even 
though its ultimate conclusion was expedited by resourceful abdicators in a rival
166 Wendy Gordon, Intellectual Property Theory Intensive Course Reader 2000, (University of Toronto, 
Fall 2000) at 7.
167 Thomas S. Kuhn, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, vol. 2:2 (London: The University of Chicago Press Ltd., 1962).
168 Ibid. at 38 where Kuhn adds:
A man may be attracted to science for all sorts of reasons. Among them are the 
desire to be useful, the excitement of exploring new territory, the hope of finding 
order, and the drive to test established knowledge... What then challenges him is 
the conviction that, if only he is skilful enough, he will succeed in solving a puzzle 
that no one before has solved or solved so well... On most occasions any particular 
field of specialization offers nothing else to do, a fact that makes it no less 
fascinating to the proper sort of addict.
169 Ibid. at 36.
170 William K. Purves et al., Life: the Science of Biology, 5th ed., vol. 1 (USA: Sinauer Associates Inc., 
1998) at Glossary.
race.171 Preventative medicine extends beyond genetic screening for specific disease 
related genes (like BRCA1 and preventative procedures such as elective 
mastectomies) to the potential uses of stem cell and gene therapy which can be 
controlled by those who hold patents on genes. Human embryonic stem (hES) cell 
research is attracting significant public funding because of its potential value. The 
National Institute for Health (NIH) spent $29 million in 2003 on such research, while 
California has committed to spending $300 million a year for the next ten years just 
in California. Despite the dedication of public funds to stem cell research, the patent 
over hES belongs to the University of Wisconsin’s Alumni Research Foundation 
(WARF) and any California company or University wanting to take advantage of the 
California bond will have to first secure a licence from WARF. 172
Furthermore, in the field of science, simultaneous independent invention is not 
uncommon due to the paradigmatic structure of the process to which Kuhn refers, 
such that rewarding one inventor over another may itself be arbitrary:
To see how closely factual and theoretical novelty are intertwined in 
scientific discovery examine a particularly famous example, the discovery 
of oxygen. At least three different men have a legitimate claim to it, and 
several other chemists must, in the early 1770’s, have had enriched air in a 
laboratory vessel without knowing it... 173 This pattern of discovery 
raises a question that can be asked about every novel phenomenon that has 
ever entered the consciousness of scientists. Was it Priestley or Lavoisier, 
if  either, who first discovered oxygen? In any case, when was oxygen 
discovered? In that form the question could be asked even if only one 
claimant had existed. As a ruling about priority and date, an answer does 
not at all concern us. Nevertheless, an attempt to produce one will 
illuminate the nature of discovery, because there is no answer of the kind 
that is sought. Discovery is not the sort of process about which the 
question is appropriately asked. The fact that it is asked- the priority for 
oxygen has repeatedly been contested since the 1780’s- is a symptom of 
something askew in the image of science that gives discovery so 
fundamental a role... Clearly we need a new vocabulary and concepts for 
analyzing events like the discovery of oxygen. Though undoubtedly 
correct, the sentence, ‘Oxygen was discovered,’ misleads by suggesting 
that discovering something is a single simple act assimilable to our usual 
(and also questionable) concept of seeing. That is why we so readily 
assume that discovering, like seeing or touching, should be unequivocally 
attributable to an individual and to a moment in time. But the latter 
attribution is always impossible, and the former often is as well.174
171 See Kevin Davies, Cracking the Genome: Inside the Race to Unlock Human DNA (New York: The 
Free Press, 2001).
172 See Carl Gulbrandsen, “Stem-cell patent holder’s view of the California challenge” (16 November
2004), online: <http://wistechnology.com/article.php?id=1352>.
173 Kuhn, supra note 167 at 53. Footnote in the original refers to the classic discussion of oxygen’s 
discovery, Andrew Norman Meldrum, The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Science—The First 
Phase (Calcutta: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930) c. v.
174 Ibid. Kuhn at 54-55.
There is tremendous inequity in granting any one individual (or entity) a 
right over a gene, ignoring the enormous public funds and co-operative international 
efforts expended in the mapping of the human genome.175 Canada has a first to file 
requirement176 for recognizing an inventor while the U.S. has a first to invent 
system; both systems create a “winner-take all effect”1 ' ' and ignore the incremental 
and cumulative nature of science. Vaver articulates the paradox created by the rules of 
the patent system in light of our understanding of scientific knowledge and progress 
as a continuum:
The decision on who gets the monopoly right where two or more persons 
invent something independently, without knowing of the other’s work, is 
often more a matter of luck than anything else: the history of science and 
invention suggests that the phenomenon of simultaneous discovery is the 
rule, not the exception. The sower who first turns up at a patent office will 
reap; the other sower will rue.178
Juxtaposing the nature of scientific development with the legal atomistic view 
of the patent system is meant to comment obliquely on two points. First, the failings 
of our current regime warn against the administrative extension of patents on an ad 
hoc basis without democratic debate and Parliamentary overview to new subject 
matter; in particular where Charter rights are affected. Having a flawed regulatory 
system for an invented mouse trap is significantly different than having a flawed 
regulatory system for genes. The discovery of genes was not in need of an 
“incentive” since it was already significantly undertaken publicly and privately 
motivated by the potential for downstream applications. Instead of acting as ex ante 
incentives, patenting genes inefficiently creates ex post rewards while contributing to 
the violation of the state’s duty to promote the human right to the highest attainable 
standard of health. The “mapping” of the human genome suggests by name a mere 
process of “discovery” rather than “invention” per se.179
175 For a discussion of the threat to the scientific commons, see Richard R. Nelson, “The Market 
Economy, and the Scientific Commons”, (Paper presented at the International Public Goods and 
Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime Conference, Dule Law 
School, April 2003), webcast online: <http://www.law.duke.edu/trips/webcast.html>.
176 See Patent Act, supra note 14, s. 28.1.
177 Edward Geller proposes an interim patent system as a means of addressing the “winner-take-all effect” 
of current national patent system. See Paul Edward Geller, “An International Patent Utopia?” (2003)
85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 582. He suggests that the interim patent system use the Internet as 
the basis of posting new inventions. This would overlay national first-to-file and first-to-invent 
systems with an international first-to-post system. Additionally, he suggests that a globally distributed 
database with searchable connection to prior patent files laid open by the public and global novelty 
determination capacity of the new technology would also help remedy resulting inequities.
178 Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 27 at 7 [footnotes omitted]. This same criticism can, of 
course, extend to prizes as well. In this manner, the contributions of Rosalind Franklin to the double 
helix structure of Watson and Crick were only later acknowledged.
179 For a critical examination of law as a form of cultural appropriation, see Rosemeary Coombe, 
“Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a Less-than-Brave New World” (1996) 48 
Stan. L. Rev. 1357 at 1360:
Second, we should be wary of racing to provide more, stronger, and 
increasingly restrictive protection paradigmatically incongruent and cognitively 
dissonant with the scientific process. Richard Nelson expresses grave concern over 
the eroding scientific commons. He believes that keeping scientific findings in the 
public domain, tying the reward of the scientist to the acclaim of fellows, and 
providing public funding for research based on peer review of the scientific promise 
of both the proposal and the scientist are all important parts of an incentive and 
control system for fostering productive science.180 Some evidence suggests that the 
incentive rationale the FCA offered is empirically unsupported:
In both the United States and Europe, firms rate superior sales and service, 
lead time, and secrecy as far more important than patents in securing the 
returns to innovation. Patents are usually reported to be important 
primarily for blocking and defensive purposes.181
In light of the evidence, the incentive to invent theory for granting patents 
remains suspect. The only discernable relationship is that legal recognition of 
patentability of a subject matter, in this case life, corresponds with an increase in 
patents for that subject matter.
The second reason the FCA identifies for providing patent protection is to 
encourage public disclosure of new technology and the facilitation of its transfer. 
The theory is that without such legal protection knowledge embodied in new 
inventions would likely be kept a trade secret.182 Again, there is no rational
The very tropes of discovery, invention, naming, and originality that animate 
modem intellectual property laws emerge from a historical era in which Europeans 
mapped the world in their own image -  ignoring the human ecologies of others and 
denying any value to the pre-existing worlds of meaning in which such phenomena 
figured ontologically and spiritually... We can see the same processes at work in 
contemporary political debates -  in the so-called ‘New World Order’ -  as authorial 
tropes are deployed to legitimate new forms of social domination. Emergent elites 
naturalize their claims to represent the global ‘we’ -  protecting ‘our’ biodiversity 
and preserving ‘our’ gene pool -  while attaching their own signatures to the 
mappings they effect.
180 See Nelson, supra note 175 at 2,22-36.
181 Bronywn H. Hall, “Business Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy” NBER Working Paper Series, 
working paper #9717 at 9, online: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9717>. See also David Vaver, 
“Some Agnostic Observations on Intellectual Property” (1991) 6 1.P.J., at 125-53.
182 Citing dictum from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cadbury-Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods 
Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142 at para. 46: “[A]t least one of the policy objectives underlying the statutory 
remedies available to a patent owner is to make disclosure more attractive, and thus hasten the 
availability of useful knowledge in the public sphere in the public interest.” This theoretical 
justification for a patent system is consistent with empirical findings presented in a dissertation written 
at the University of California at Berkeley using 19th century invention data from World’s Fairs and 
Expositions. See Petra Moser, “How do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth 
Century World Fairs” (2005) 95 Am.Econ.Rev. 1214, cited in Hall, supra note 181 at 8. Moser found 
that inventors in countries without a patent system do not innovate more than inventors in countries 
with a patent system but they do tend to innovate in areas that are more amenable to protection through 
trade secrecy.
connection between this rationale and the grant of gene patents. The international 
consortium of scientists involved in the various mapping projects, from the HGP to 
its successor the HAPMAP project (aimed at mapping genes clustered into haplotype 
communities) all publish their findings immediately as a means of disclosure and 
pre-emption of private proprietary claims (which are thereby defeated by the prior 
disclosure on the basis of novelty). According to Richard Gold, an eminent scholar 
in law, genetics, and ethics, we may conclude that the patent regime’s current level 
of incentive for inducing sufficient biomedical research is questionable:
The argument for greater patent protection should be understood for what 
it is: an attempt to maximize profit, not to maximize levels of innovation.
Clearly, a company would prefer to have as large a monopoly as 
possible...But patent law is not about individual profit maximization; it is 
about maximizing the overall level of innovation in society. The two do 
not necessarily go together.183
In a recent article, Dr. Linda Wasserman, director of the molecular genetics lab 
in the department of medicine at the University of California in San Diego and 
director of clinical cancer genetics at the UCSD Cancer Center, commented on the 
harm:
[G]ene patenting complicates testing.. .Every new gene getting patented 
means that whatever lab has the patent is the only one that can afford to do 
gene testing. It has a negative effect on developing quicker, more efficient 
ways to do a genetic test and it raises costs. The question is, should anyone 
have sole possession of a genetic test?184
Current patent law granting genes patents is arbitrary in that it neither is 
consistent nor necessary for the objectives of the Patent Act. Normatively, the 
rational measure of protection may need to be differentiated in relation to the degrees 
of protection necessary for creating incentives inter and intra industry, specific to our 
social and economic context. But, with limited exception, that is not permissible 
under TRIPS. Still, a rational national policy for IPRs would be one that provides 
neither over-compensation nor under-compensation, but a degree of protection that 
would ensure that the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of such protection. 
The CPO’s application of the statutory standards for patentability with greater care 
and stringency is a TRIPS-compliant means of achieving improved industrial policy. 
With gene patents, the so-called “inventors” are currently overcompensated because 
of lax application of patent standards. The SCC has recognized the importance of a 
careful balance in intellectual property policy:
183 E.Richard Gold, “Biomedical Patents and Ethics: A Canadian Solution” (2000) 45 McGill LJ. 413 at 
423.
184 Steve Benowitz, “French Challenge to BRCA1 Patent Underlies European Discontent” (2002) 94:2 
Journal of the National Cancer Institute 80, online: <http://jncicancerspectrum.oxfordjoumals.org 
/cgi/content/full/jnci;94/2/80>.
The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not 
only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their 
limited nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to 
overcompensate artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it 
would be self-defeating to undercompensate them...Excessive control by 
holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly
limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative 
innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create 
practical obstacles to proper utilization.185
An efficient IP policy striving for equilibrium will necessarily relate to the 
context and defining circumstances of a nation and “clearly involves a value 
judgment, a weighing of costs and benefits, striking a balance, and recognizing that 
the matter is one on which minds even within the same state -  let alone among states 
-  may reasonably differ.”186
Chaoulli recognizes a negative right to health that is only engaged or activated 
as part of s. 7 freedoms where the government creates the situation of increased risk. 
In other words, the obligation to protect health in Chaoulli arises only if there is an 
increased risk of harm that is either state sanctioned or state created. Just as the 
Court was satisfied that a monopoly in health coupled with wait times would suffice, 
so too should a monopoly in medically related discoveries. S. 7 rights are 
distributive while the requirements of fundamental justice are substantive. The 
appropriate test case is not one in which the government would be sued for failure to 
provide the BRCA1 genetic test due to limited resources just as the failure to provide 
timely testing was not the basis of the constitutional challenge in Chaoulli. Such a 
suit would require the court to recognize a positive right to health and one that is set 
at a particular level. Rather, public authority liability under the Charter applies to a 
regulatory scheme that is operating negligently and is thereby an unjustifiable state 
intrusion on the right to health as subsumed in s. 7, regardless of whether the regime 
is the public monopoly legislated with exclusive rights to health delivery (with a ban 
on private providers) or the private monopoly created under the patent scheme with 
exclusive rights of use, manufacture, and control of genetic information, integral for
185 Theberge v. Galerie d ’Art du Petit Champlain, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 at para. 6, Binnie recognizes the 
“globalization of the so-called ‘cultural industries’” and the desirability “within the limits permitted by 
our own legislation, to harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with other like-minded 
jurisdictions” but the harmonization and restrictions should be by legislation, not expansive 
administrative (and judicial) interpretion [Theberge]. See Amani & Coombe, supra note 51, regarding 
legislative inertia and judicial activism with respect to patenting life. The need for a balance IP 
framework was also discussed in Harvard (SCC), supra note 149 at para. 25, to support the conclusion 
that patent rights should be extended to a genetically modified oncomouse by Binnie J. in his dissent: 
“[i]t is necessary to feed the goose if it is to continue to lay the golden eggs. The Patent Act embodies 
the public policy that those who directly benefit from an invention should be asked, through the patent 
system, to pay for it, at least in part.” He warns at para. 113 that the majority’s conclusion “simply 
substitutes the Court’s notion of good public policy for the judgment of Parliament, whose members 
are well aware of these and similar proposals.”
186 David Vaver, “Need Intellectual Property Be Everywhere? Against Ubiquity and Uniformity” (2002)
25 Dal. LJ. 1 at 4.
the future of preventative and therapeutic medicine (including neo-natal genetic 
screening programs and gene therapies). Having established that the measure in 
question is arbitrary, as a complainant I would next turn to s. 1 of the Charter to see 
if the state is able to prove that the derogation of my s. 7 rights are “reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.”187
Under the s. 1 analysis, the the reasonable limit on the Charter right must be 
“prescribed by law”. According to constitutional expert Peter Hogg, ”[t]he words 
‘prescribed by law’ make clear that an act that is not legally authorized can never be 
justified under s. 1, no matter how reasonable or demonstrably justified it may 
appear to be.”188
Significant discretion is granted to the CPO by the CPA to interpret and apply 
the requirements of patentability but as the SCC points out, “such discretion must be 
exercised in accordance with the Charter.”189 Hogg writes that “a law that confers a 
discretion on a board or official to act in derogation of a Charter right will satisfy the 
prescribed-by-law requirement if the disretion is constrained by legal standards.” 
The CPO is given clear legal statutory standards for patentability but if the CPO, in 
granting gene patents, interprets patent legislation in such a way that it is acting 
outside of its statutory authority then the actions of the CPO will not be “prescribed 
by law” for reasons set out by Hogg:
Action taken under statutory authority is valid only if it is within the scope 
of that authority. Since neither Parliament nor a Legislature can itself pass 
a law in breach of the Charter, neither body can authorize action which 
would be in breach of the Charter. Thus, the limitations on statutory 
authority which are imposed by the Charter will flow down the chain of 
statutory authority and apply to regulations, by-laws, orders, decisions and 
all other action (whether legislative, administrative or judicial) which 
depends for its validity on statutory authority.191
It will be up to the presiding judges to determine this aspect of the s. 1 Charter 
justification analysis. I will proceed through the remaining burden the Crown must 
discharge in order to justify the infringement of s. 7 rights.
It has long been established that the contested measure must be assessed for 
constitutionality under s. 1 in accordance with the Oakes test.192 Just as with
187 Charter, supra note 16.
188 Hogg, Consitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., supra note 35 at 861.
189 Little Sisters, supra note 33 at para. 133.
190 Hogg, Consitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., supra note 35 at 863.
191 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf, supra note 33 at 34-11; also cited in Little Sisters, 
supra note 33 at para 133.
192 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
Chaoulli and the desire to protect a public health system, no one questions the need 
to preserve a sound patent system as one which, theoretically and conceptually, 
exists to promote the innovation of health improving technologies with a short term 
trade-off of a limited monopoly to the inventor for commerciability. The 
government undeniably has an interest in protecting this system if we accept the fact 
the the twenty year patent period is a fair trade-off to create long term gains for the 
benefit of public and individual health. Thus, the objective of the patent system is 
pressing and substantial. However, it is not clear whether that objective translates in 
the same way to the granting of gene patents.
The next branch of the Oakes test is the proportionality requirement. Here we 
consider whether the granting of patents has a rational connection with the objectives 
of spurring innovation and its early disclosure as required for an effective patent 
system; and whether there is minimal impairment of constitutional rights. Is the 
granting of gene patents justified by the need for a patent system?193 Unlike 
Chaoulli, a complainant does not have an internal safeguard that serves as an 
alternative -  they cannot simply go outside of the province or country to receive 
services through an alternative provider since the patent grants a monopoly of 
exclusive rights to a single entity and these rights confer full control, often in 
multiple jurisdictions. In fact, an emerging service model of business operation is 
increasingly being used whereby instead of granting a licence over their patented 
invention, the patentee requires tissue samples and provides all of the genetic testing. 
This model is followed by Myriad Genetic Laboratories for their BRCA1 and 2 gene 
patents. Not only are there no alternative providers due to the patent monopoly, 
there may be limited regulatory or quality control mechanisms for the tests processed 
exclusively through Myriad because of its location outside of Canada. If the testing 
is performed through MDS Labs, Myriad’s agent in Canada, it requires a sample 
which, from a research perspective, may create future impediments for researchers 
thwarting the very purpose of the CPA. The Europeans, for example, were not very 
accepting of the loss of sovereignty over BRCA testing in part because of the costs to 
have the test, the added cost of international shipment and delivery, the delays of 
having a single source assessor, and other impediments created for further cancer 
research. Had the efforts of Watson and Crick and the double helical structure of the 
DNA molecule been patented as genes are today, the HGP, a conglomerate of co­
ordinated mapping efforts by international scientists and research into their coding 
for proteins (proteomics) would have been significantly slowed and encumbered. In 
fact, in 2006, a new project, the Genetic Association Information Network (GAIN) 
was launched as the latest collaboration. GAIN is based on a private-public 
partnership between the Foundation for the National Institutes for Health (FNIH), the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Pfizer Global Research & Development. Its 
goal is “to unravel the genetic causes of common diseases over the next three 
years... The information derived from GAIN will be publicly available to researchers
193 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 14, refers to the preservation of a “sound public health system”.
world-wide.”194 GAIN signals overdue recognition that genetic data is a public good 
that it should be pre-competitive and not subject to intellectual property claims.
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg brought concern over the growing 
transaction costs of doing research due to private enclosure into the fray. In a 
compelling and often cited 1998 article,195 the authors observe a developing trend 
antithetical to the patents for the promotion of innovation rationale. The authors 
argue that patenting basic research such as the human genome imposes the need to 
bundle multiple licences, raises barriers to entry, and increases transaction costs, 
which all have long term deleterious effects on innovation and its dissemination:
Under the commons model, the federal government sponsored premarket 
or “upstream” research and encouraged broad dissemination of results in 
the public domain. Unpatented biomedical discoveries were freely 
incorporated in “downstream” products for diagnosing and treating 
disease. In 1980, in an effort to promote commercial development of new 
technologies, Congress began encouraging universities and other 
institutions to patent discoveries arising from federally supported research 
and development and transfer their technology to the private sector...A 
resource is prone to underuse in a “tragedy of the anticommons” when 
multiple owners each have the right to exclude others from a scarce 
resource and no one has an effective privilege of use...Privatization can 
go astray when too many owners hold rights in pervious discoveries that 
constitute obstacles for future research...The result has been a spiral of 
overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners, reaching ever 
further upstream in the course of biomedical research. 196
194 National Human Genome Institute, News Release, “Novel Public-Private Partnership Created to 
Unravel the Genetics Of Common Disease Through Whole Genome Association Studies” (8 February 
2006) online: <http://www.genome.gov/17516722>.
195 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research” Science 280:1364 (1 May 1998) 698, online: 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/280/5364/698.pdf>.
196 Ibid. at 698. The tragedy of the anti-commons is where people underuse scarce resources because too 
m any  owners can block each other. “Privatization must be more carefully deployed if it is to serve the 
public goals of biomedical research. Policy-makers should seek to ensure coherent boundaries of 
upstream patents and minimize restritive licensing practies that interfere with downstream product 
development. Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for 
improving human health.” at 701. See also Hope Shand, “Gene Giants: Understanding the ‘Life 
Industry’” in Brian Tokar, ed., Redesigning Life? The Worldwide Challenge to Genetic Engineering 
(Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) at 226, commenting on patents as bars to entry for 
smaller less resourceful firms:
The power of exclusive monopoly patents is giving these companies the legal right 
to determine who gets access to proprietary science and at what price. Participation 
in industry isn’t possible unless a company holds patents or has the money to 
license them... Pioneer Hi-Bred, the world’s largest seed company (now a wholly 
owned subsidiary of DuPont), claims that one of its new, genetically engineered, 
insect-resistant com hybrids requires access to thirty-eight different patents 
controlled by sixteen separate patent holders... [S]maller enterprises will find it 
increasingly difficult to compete.
The excessive fragmentation of patent rights in the technological base for 
commercially oriented innovation may deter not only private competitors from 
investing in follow-up innovation, as Heller and Eisenberg suggest, but may produce 
greater and disproportionate transaction costs on the very institutions -  universities -  
whose mandate hitherto has been to do property-less research. In such an 
environment, universities may find it too prohibitive to pursue large scale research 
endeavors and may have to redirect their focus to become teaching schools (sources 
for dissemination) of private labs under licence. These factors all reaffirm the 
arbitrariness of the measure. McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. query “whether an 
arbitrary provision, which by reason of its arbitrariness cannot further its stated 
objective, will ever meet the rational connection test under R v. Oakes”191 The 
absence of evidence that the granting of gene patents furthers the patent system’s 
objectives, its inconsistencies with legislative objectives, and the fact that it is not 
necessary for the preservation or integrity of the patent system suggests that the 
government will fail in discharging their burden of a rational connection between the 
measure and the objective. However, if a court finds otherwise, crown counsel will 
still have to proceed through the remainder of the Oakes test.
On the issue of minimal impairment of the Charter rights, there are existing 
provisions within the CPA that protect against abuse of patents and provide for 
compulsory licencing of inventions for “government use”. Again, these are 
piecemeal and any efforts to make use of these provisions would have to comply 
with statutory requirements. In addition, such an individualized analysis does not 
consider the propriety of the policy or operational discretion to grant gene patents in 
the first place. The resulting private enclosure of basic knowledge, which impacts on 
future research and development and the delivery of health in a timely and cost 
efficient manner, is not proportionate to the beneficial effects of granting gene 
patents to the patent system as a whole -  particularly since genetic research would 
occur in the absence of this incentive. The measure goes further than necessary in 
granting exclusive rights for investment rather than “invention” without qualification 
or commitment to the legal requirements of patentability. There are a number of 
responses to the concerns raised by biopatenting that would help to ensure the 
necessary balance with the public’s interest in patented inventions. The most 
obvious is to amend the CPA to exclude patentability of all life. Amendments could 
provide specific exemptions to infringement or public policy exclusions from 
patentability (i.e. genes or human/animal chimera are not patentable). Legislated 
special provisions, like those governing the Patented Medicines Prices Review 
Board,19 could be drafted to respond to the concern over prohibitive prices that 
biotech patents create for the delivery of health by providing that patented genes, 
genetic tests and health products receive similar treatment as patented medicines and 
are subjected to price review mechanisms. These responses are TRIPS compliant 
and human rights consistent and were made in fact by Austin and Amani in relation
197 Chaoulli, supra note 18 at para. 155.
198 Patent Act, supra note 14, s. 83-85.
to gene patents to the Ontario Advisory Committee on New Genetic Technologies in 
2001.199
The last requirement of the Oakes test is that the benefits of the measure, the 
granting of patents on genes must outweigh its deleterious effects. For the reasons 
discussed, they do not, especially given the paradoxical findings of the SCC in the 
two recent patenting life cases. In the Harvard mouse decision,200 the SCC found 
that non-human genetically modified higher life (an oncomouse) was not a 
patentable invention under the CPA. As the case before the SCC in Harvard was 
only about animals, presumably that Court’s consistent reference to plants and 
animals, and the specific finding in obiter that existing plant breeder legislation 
suggested that plants were not patentable, was an effort by the majority to prescribe a 
legal standard for treating the issue of patents on higher life forms as a class 
inclusive of plants and animals with the pending Schmeiser appeal in mind. 
However, Harvard’s majority became Schmeiser’s minority opinion and the 
deference to Parliament to legislate the patentability of higher life was quickly 
usurped by a reconstituted SCC in 2004. In Schmeiser,201 Monsanto’s patent 
covered claims to a chimeric plant gene that encoded for an enzyme which conferred 
resistance to glyphosate herbicide such as Roundup that Monsanto produces. The 
claims extended to plant cells that contained the chimeric gene. The SCC found that 
even though plants are not patentable, the collection, saving, and planting of seeds 
containing Monsanto’s patented gene and cell constituted an infringing “use” of the 
invention, and contravened the patentee’s guarantee of exclusive rights.202 The 
implication of this decision was to provide back door protection for what has been 
found to be legally unpatentable by extending the definition of “use” under the CPA. 
This makes gene patents significantly more deleterious since a patented gene is now 
determinative of more expansive rights that will extend to anything that contains it 
even though these embodiments (plants and animals) are themselves not patentable 
by law. In addition, knowing that medical intervention exists but is unavailable due 
to the patent has significant mental and emotional harm as well as its associated 
physical harm. Just as it was in Chaoulli, “the physical and psychological suffering 
and risk of death that may result outweigh whatever benefit (and none has been 
demonstrated to us here) there may be to the system as a whole.”203 To conclude, 
Chaoulli is not necessarily the poison for public health but may prove to be the elixir 
for the rights to life, liberty and security of the person in finding that within these 
rights there exists a negative right to health when considering an existing quasi-
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tortious understanding of Charter obligations that posits “if the government chooses 
to act, it must do so properly.”204
If the granting of gene patents is found to be unconstitutional, what are the 
remedies available under s. 24 of the Charter? Governmental accountability in 
Canada is enshrined under s. 24(1) and (2) of the Charter. One could seek Charter 
damages on the basis of the “constitutional tort” without the need to establish the 
remaining elements for Negligence within s. 7 since the mere violation of the right is 
itself wrongful. This helps the complainant with difficult burdens to discharge in 
terms of duty, causation, and remoteness, and arguably overcomes limitation periods 
and available common law defences. Second, a declaration of unconstitutionality 
coupled with an injunction on further grants of gene patents by the CPO, and a 
moratorium on enforcement are all helpful remedies that can be granted under the 
Charter. However, none of these address the economic and political costs necessary 
to deter governments from prioritizing industrial and trade policy over health policy. 
Nor do they compel Parliament in any way to remedy the current state of patent 
regulation and policy. Where an individual is bringing the case forward on the basis 
of actual harm in addition to the deprivation of his or her right, an individual award 
of monetary damages may be desirable as compensation and vindication of her rights 
and if pursued as a class action, may create the incentive necessary for reforming 
Canadian patent office practice and policy.
C o n c l u sio n
In response to the international crisis related to access to essential medicines, the 
Canadian government reviewed and amended our patent legislation in order to allow 
the manufacture and export of generic drugs (particularly those needed for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis) to developing countries lacking 
manufacturing capacity, and thereby promoted the health of individuals abroad.205 
Yet, there was no corresponding effort to mediate the health impact of patenting life 
and biotech patents at home and so patents continue to issue on “inventions” such as 
the protein coding for the entry way to AIDS, the human stem cell and cancer related 
genes. Patent validity proceedings do not present a practical viable option for 
challenging all of the existing gene patents that have issued and will remain valid in 
Canada for years to come. Existing private action in tort law similarly does not offer 
a suitable means of ensuring public authority accountability in this context. What are 
the prospects for the vision of public law redress I have put forward in this analysis? 
Dr. Terrence Sullivan et. al. write that “the Chaoulli decision has the potential to 
affect how cancer services are organized and delivered in the future.”206
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The purpose of this article was to provide an opportunity to “rethink” public 
sector liability in relation to gene patents given the new treatment of the right to 
health under the Charter. I also mean to celebrate the decision, against a rally of 
criticism, for its potential progressive outcome. In the process, I wish to demonstrate 
the interdependence of domestic regulatory policies and the need for greater co­
ordination to ensure a more efficient and effective system of governance between 
industry and health. That Chaoulli was marked by a 3:3 split on the Charter issue 
indicates that there is still quite a ways to go before any of my proposals become a 
reality. But the decision may start to influence lower courts to conceptualize health 
as a constitutionally protected right and to inform their decisions with this in mind 
such that eventually, there may be a body of law recognizing a right to health that 
parallels common law duties of government for wrongs in tort. In this way, the next 
time the SCC revisits the issue of health rights under the Charter, a more inclusive 
and human rights compliant framework may be adopted in favour of health 
protection. Additionally, I hope to have encouraged a rethinking of the granting of 
gene patents. The SCC’s Decision of 2005 in Chaoulli has changed the prognosis on 
the utility of the Charter as a normative framework for prioritizing health over 
industrial policy by further developing government accountability for regulatory 
negligence.
To summarize, Chaoulli is an important decision of the SCC for several 
reasons. First, it recognized that appellants Dr. Chaoulli and Mr. Z, neither of whom 
was immediately affected by the infringement had standing to bring the 
constitutional challenge.207 Second, the majority embraced social and economic 
rights as justiciable, rejecting the Attorney General of Canada and Quebec’s 
submission that these are inherently political decisions. McLachlin C.J.C. writes: 
“There is nothing in our constitutional arrangement to exclude ‘political questions’ 
from judicial review where the Constitution itself is alleged to be violated.” 208 
Third, on the issue of deference, the majority asserted the Court’s jurisdiction to 
judicially review government decisions, even if they are policy based, for conformity 
with Charter law. Fourth, not only was the Court’s jurisdiction affirmed, the 
majority went further in finding a duty of the Court to act as steward of individual 
rights in order to ensure that the utilitarian goals of governance, and “social policy 
engineering” do not come at the cost of compromising individual rights. This is 
important since patents are normatively justified for their utility in encouraging 
research and development. The majority recognized harm within the language of s. 7 
“life” and “security of the person” as extending to both serious psychological and 
physical suffering which arguably extends to situations where one knows that a 
genetic test exists but cannot access it for reasons associated with the state created 
patent monopoly. In determining whether any deprivation of the rights are in 
accordance with the principles of “fundamental justice” the Court draws some bright 
lines regarding arbitrariness. The decision recognizes the duty of care owed to 
citizens by their governments is one that requires our regulators not to interfere with
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the realization of the right to health. This, I have argued, opens the door for 
constitutional tort damage claims for a breach of this duty of care in other regulatory 
contexts. For these reasons, Chaoulli fills me with excitement. I cannot help but 
share Professor Lome Sossin’s optimism and “believe the decision may yet have a 
surprisingly progressive influence on Charter jurisprudence [b]y establishing the 
connection between deprivations of the basic necessaries of life and fundamental 
rights”.209 When “rethinking public authority liability”, this is a healthy place to 
start.
209 Lome Sossin, “Two-Tier Constitution”, supra note 119 at 178.
